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ABSTRACT 
China’s reactions to the U.S.-India nuclear deal and their implications for the 
United States are presented in this thesis.  The 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1998 Indian 
Nuclear test were the prime causes of the enduring Sino-Indian rivalries, and differing 
views from Beijing, New Delhi, and Washington are explored.  The U.S.-India Strategic 
Partnership is briefly covered with emphasis placed on the desired improvements in U.S.-
India Civil Nuclear Cooperation.  Several Chinese-specific concepts, Beijing’s White 
Paper on arms control, as well as, Beijing’s perceptions of threats from Washington and 
New Delhi are considered before Beijing’s perceptions of and reactions to the India deal 
are investigated.  This thesis concludes by analyzing the implications of Chinese 
reactions to the U.S.-India nuclear deal and offers recommendations for U.S. policy 
toward Asia.  Although the deal has not been formally concluded as of the writing of this 
thesis, the intent, implications, and reactions are all relevant to policy considerations. 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The current Bush administration’s nuclear policy towards India is a major 
departure from what had been the course of U.S. foreign policy for the last three decades.  
It is also controversial because the United States is agreeing to recognize India as a 
nuclear power despite the fact that India is not a signatory to the 1968 Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).  The purpose of this thesis is to assess China’s reactions 
to the U.S.-India nuclear deal and their implications for the United States.   
According to the Hyde Act of December 2006 (also known as the “India deal” or 
the “U.S.-India nuclear deal”), the United States agrees to acknowledge India as a 
globally-responsible possessor of nuclear weapons.  In return, India agrees to “assume the 
same responsibility and practices” as if it were a NPT state, separate its civilian and 
military nuclear facilities, place two-thirds of its current civilian reactors (14 out of 22) 
under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection and keep the remaining 
for military use, as well as, extending its moratorium on nuclear testing.1   
While supporters of this deal emphasize the improvement of bilateral relations, 
nonproliferation experts argue the technicalities in dealing with nuclear weapons and 
America’s strategic priorities.  It is also widely speculated that America’s hidden agenda 
is to contain a rising China and maintain a balance of power in Asia.   
For the United States, China was a “strategic partner” during the Clinton 
administration and became a “strategic competitor” during the Bush administration.  
China’s success in its January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test, where it destroyed one of 
its own orbiting weather satellites, combined with the continuing military build-up as 
asserted by the Pentagon,2 appears to have elevated the murkiness of China’s increasing 
military budget above all other standing bilateral issues.  Trade issues between the United 
States and China are also being taken very seriously.  Some in the U.S. Congress have 
                                                 
1 Sharon Squassoni and Jill Marie Parillo, U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation:  A Side-by-Side 
Comparison of Current Legislation (Washington, D.C.:  Congressional Research Service, 2006) 1.  
RL33561. 
2 Robert Gates, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007 
(Washington, D.C.:  Department of Defense, 2007).  http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/china.html.  Date 
accessed:  May 31, 2007.   
2 
threatened to take punitive actions against China as a result of its refusal to float the 
renminbi (RMB), the growing U.S. trade deficit with China in the range of hundreds of 
billions of dollars, as well as China’s violation of World Trade Organization (WTO) 
requirement to crack down intellectual property rights (IPR) piracy, which are also 
costing U.S. industries billions of dollars. 
 Aside from these delicate issues, Chinese actions are as predictable as usual when 
dealing with North Korea.  As for Taiwan, China’s arms build-up continues despite ever 
expanding cultural and economic exchanges between the two.  Of additional note is 
China’s voracious appetite for resources to fuel its economy.  Economic growth is vital 
for domestic stability and regime survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  The 
Chinese quest for resources and access to export markets has taken it to parts of the world 
(i.e., the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia) where anti-American 
sentiments are prevalent.3   
While China officially kept silent of its opposition to the U.S.-India nuclear deal, 
the government-controlled media outlets acted otherwise.  Accusations such as “double 
standards” on nuclear proliferation and setting the precedent for others to follow in 
weakening the NPT regime surfaced.4  Concerns of India dedicating its resources and 
energy to the research and development of nuclear weapons, as well as, the rights of 
others to develop civil nuclear energy were also raised.  “Wouldn’t it be possible for 
other nuclear states to cooperate with Pakistan in the development of nuclear energy?  




                                                 
3 Philip C. Saunders, China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools.  (Washington, D.C.:  
Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2006), 24.  http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Occasional_Papers/OCP4.pdf.  
Date accessed: November 14, 2006. 
4 “Clash of Two Nuclear Pacts.”  Indian Express, January 4, 2006.  LexisNexis.  Date accessed:  
November 12, 2006.  Original article on People’s Daily Online could no longer be located, hence the citing 
of second-hand source. 
5 “PRC Scholar Criticizes Bush Administration’s India Nuclear Policy.”  Shanghai Dongfang Zaobao, 
June 20, 2006.  Translated by Open Source Center.  www.opensource.gov.  Date accessed: December 3, 
2006.   
3 
has signaled that it could follow Washington’s path.  Ironically, China also published a 
white paper on arms control and non-proliferation very shortly after the U.S.-India 
nuclear deal was announced.6   
For India, the opportunity to receive assistance from the world’s superpower to 
improve national security in areas such as arms purchases, missile defense, high-
technology trade, space, and nuclear cooperation, is rare, and it is keen to seize the 
opportunity.  However, if the India deal is one of the U.S. government’s strategies to 
limit China’s growing influence, then the effectiveness of this strategy may be in 
question, as Sino-Indian relations have shown signs of improvement.  China and India 
have ongoing high-level dialogues in resolving border disputes.  Bilateral trade and 
cultural exchanges have also increased over the recent years.  While American companies 
such as General Electric and Bechtel have been poised to compete in India’s estimated 
$60-100 billion dollar nuclear power industry, private companies in India and state-
owned companies in China have been preparing to do the same.7  Furthermore, Chinese 
President Hu Jintao’s four-nation visit to South Asia in November 2006 included India 
and Pakistan, where a multitude of Sino-Indian and Sino-Pakistani agreements were 
signed.  This was the first visit to India by a Chinese head of state in a decade, which 
shows India’s elevated importance in China’s foreign policy.8     
 Beijing and New Delhi are both pursuing a strategy of diversifying their energy 
supplies.  Both have competed directly over energy deals and indirectly for influence in 
Central Asia, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Africa, and Southeast Asia.  When China 
prevails, India’s “energy diplomacy” has been to “develop as many potential supply 
                                                 
6 “China Publishes White Paper on Arms Control.”  China Internet Information Center, August 31, 
2005.  http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Aug/140343.htm.  Date accessed: November 30, 2006.  
According to this white paper titled “China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-
Proliferation,” the aim is to “fully elaborate [China’s policies and position]…and to give a systematic 
account of China’s involvement in the international [community].” 
7 Raman Bhaskar, “Outside View:  Bush tornado in South Asia.”  United Press International (UPI), 
March 2006.  LexisNexis.  Date accessed: November 12, 2006.     
8 Robert Gates, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007 
(Washington, D.C.:  Department of Defense, 2007).  http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/china.html.  Date 
accessed:  May 31, 2007.   
4 
arrangements, with as many potential suppliers, as it possibly can, and to try to neutralize 
its potential competitors (principally China) with cooperation agreements.”9   
 Regardless of the improving ties, Sino-Indian relations have not always been 
harmonious.  China and India, two neighboring countries divided by the Himalayas, have 
been rivals more than friends since their independence in the late 1940s.  A number of 
disagreements exist in Sino-Indian relations: territorial disputes dealing with Tibet, 
Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Sino-Pakistani relations, Burma, the Indian Ocean, and nuclear 
weapons.10   
 When India used the “China threat” and China’s alleged involvement in 
Pakistan’s nuclear program as justifications for its 1998 nuclear tests, China reacted 
strongly, stating that India’s action “is nothing but outrageous contempt for the common 
will of the international community...[India] will entail serious consequences...”11  One 
China scholar even suggested that “one should not conclude that China will ignore the 
seriousness of the threat posed by India’s nuclear weapons in the future…”12   
 Most recently, the Chinese Ambassador to India told the Indian press that “the 
whole of what you call the [Indian] state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory…we 
are claiming all of that—that’s our position.”13  This remark, which took place on the eve 
of Chinese President Hu Jintao’s historical visit to India, shows China’s determination to 
maintain sovereignty in disputed territory.  In addition to the standing issues, China sees 
India’s foreign policies vis-à-vis Japan, Taiwan, Russia, and the United States as contrary 
to its interests.   
                                                 
9 Vibhuti Haté, “India’s Energy Dilemma.”  Center for Strategic and International Studies South Asia 
Monitor, September 7, 2006.  http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/sam98.pdf.  Date accessed: November 
12, 2006. 
10 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest:  Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle:  
University of Washington Press, 2001), 3-22.  Dr. Garver is a well-published scholar on China and India.  
He is a professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. 
11 Jing-dong Yuan, “India’s Rise after Pokhran II:  Chinese Analyses and Assessments,” Asian Survey 
41 (2001):  979. 
12 Lei Guang, “From national identity to national security:  China’s changing responses toward India 
in 1962 and 1998,” The Pacific Review 17 (2004):  415. 
13 Robert Gates, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007 
(Washington, D.C.:  Department of Defense, 2007).  http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/china.html.  Date 
accessed:  May 31, 2007.   
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 In light of the Sino-Indian disagreements and the newly-embraced Sino-Indian 
friendship, the major question this thesis seeks to answer is:  What are the implications of 
Chinese reactions for the United States?  In doing so, this thesis proceeds through the 
following subordinate questions: 
 
1. What was the state of Sino-Indian relations before 9/11? 
2. What is Washington’s view of Sino-Indian relations prior to 9/11? 
3. What are the Chinese perceptions of the U.S.-India nuclear deal? 
4.   How will China react to the U.S.-India nuclear deal? 
5. What are the implications of Chinese reactions for the United 
States? 
  
Chapter II will answer the first two questions.  In answering the first question, the 
focus of the Sino-Indian rivalries will be on the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1998 
Indian nuclear test, where India cited its “China threat” theory as the justification for the 
nuclear test.  In answering the second question, this chapter will also cover America’s 
view of both China and India.   
Chapter III will focus on unfolding the four areas of U.S.-India strategic 
cooperation:  security, high-technology trade, space, and nuclear cooperation.  Emphasis 
will be placed on nuclear cooperation, as it is the focus of this thesis.  Reaction from 
Pakistan will also be covered, as India and Pakistan have been archrivals since their 
independence, and India also cited China’s alleged assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear 
program as one of the reasons behind the 1998 nuclear test. 
Chapter IV will answer the third and the fourth questions.  In answering the third 
question, Chinese perceptions of the U.S.-India nuclear deal will be covered.  This 
chapter will also answer the fourth question on how China will react to the India deal 
based on its views of the U.S.-India “love fest.”14  The United States’ recognition of 
India, a non-NPT state, as a global nuclear power threatens China’s status as Asia’s sole 
                                                 
14 This phrase was coined by BG Feroz Khan during his class on Security in South Asia, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July-September, 2007. 
6 
legitimate nuclear power as recognized by the NPT.  More explicitly, the U.S.-India 
nuclear deal is the United States’ indirect endorsement of India’s military nuclear 
program.   
 Chapter V will answer the fifth question:  Implications of Chinese reactions for 
the United States.  This concluding chapter will also recap chapter summaries from 
earlier and provide recommendations relating to U.S. foreign policies in Asia. 
7 
II. ENDURING SINO-INDIAN RIVALRIES 
 
This chapter serves as the background for the enduring Sino-Indian rivalries and 
answers the first two questions.  The first question “what was the state of Sino-Indian 
relations before 9/11?” will be answered from both Beijing and New Delhi’s view points 
of the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1998 Indian nuclear test.  The second question 
“what is Washington’s view of Sino-Indian relations prior to 9/11?” will be answered in 
the last section of this chapter. 
This chapter is divided into four sections:  Beijing’s view of New Delhi on the 
1962 war and 1998 nuclear test, New Delhi’s view of Beijing on the same events, 
Washington’s view of both Beijing and New Delhi, and chapter summary.  
A. BEIJING’S VIEW OF NEW DELHI 
 In Beijing’s eyes, there are no eternal enemies or allies; the only permanent 
agenda vis-à-vis its foreign policy is its national interests.15  Sino-Indian relations in the 
decade leading up to their 1962 border conflict can be described as friendly, although 
each had their own agendas. While border disputes in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh 
were to blame, Tibet is the root cause for the 1962 Sino-Indian War.    
1. 1962 Sino-Indian War 
 Tibet is a large area where both China and India over-lap their self-perceived 
historical spheres of influence.  Territorial disputes over Tibet can be characterized as the 
main quarrel between the two.  Mao Zedong was determined to end China’s so-called 
“Century of National Humiliation” and reclaim all territories lost during this shameful 
period in the Chinese history.  Not only that, Mao saw “China’s Tibet” as a buffer zone 
essential to “his” national security.  As a result, Beijing interpreted New Delhi’s 
“concerns” over Tibet, its tolerance towards the Dalai Lama, and its leniency towards 
Tibetan refugees on Indian soil as interference in Beijing’s internal affairs.  “By keeping 
                                                 
15 Parris H. Chang, “U.S.-China Relations:  From Hostility to Euphoria to Realism,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 476 (1984):  157.  Dr. Chang is Professor Emeritus of 
Political Science at Penn State University and has authored numerous articles on China’s foreign policies. 
8 
Tibet weak and the PLA out of Tibet, New Delhi hoped to keep Tibet open to Indian 
penetration and exploitation in ways established by and inherited from the British 
imperialists.”16  Additionally, Tibet possesses 40 percent of “China’s” mineral resources.  
Most notable are high-grade uranium deposits, possibly Asia’s largest copper deposits, 
China’s richest gold deposits, and petroleum.17  Mao emphasized that, “The national 
minority areas are extensive and rich in resources…  The Han nationality must actively 
assist the national minorities to carry out social economics….”18 
Other Sino-Indian border disputes include Aksai Chin in the eastern sector and 
Arunachal Pradesh in the western sector of the Himalayas.  Due to terrain, weather, and 
logistical reasons, the PLA constructed Xinjiang-Tibet Highway south of the Johnson 
Line in Aksai Chin in 1957, directly linking China’s Xingjiang to Tibet, thus enhancing 
Beijing’s direct control over Tibet.  Meanwhile, border skirmishes over Arunachal 
Pradesh continued.  Beijing rejected the McMahon Line and claims more favorable 
boundaries in its quest for areas south of the line.   
After New Delhi rejected Zhou Enlai’s “informal offer” for a comprehensive 
compromise settlement of the boundary (i.e., swap Aksai Chin for the Chinese-claimed 
territory of Arunachal Pradesh) in 1960, Mao concluded that the U.S.-India-U.S.S.R. 
anti-China coalition sought to keep the new China weak by splitting Tibet from China 
and denying China nuclear weapons.19  To reinforce his belief, Mao told a Nepali 
delegation in 1964 that the major problem in the Sino-Indian relations is “…the Tibet 
                                                 
16 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest:  Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle:  
University of Washington Press, 2001), 15-37.   
17 Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows:  A History of Modern Tibet since 1947 
(London:  Pimlico, 1999), 518.  As cited in John W. Garver, Protracted Contest:  Sino-Indian Rivalry in 
the Twentieth Century (Seattle:  University of Washington Press, 2001), 37. 
18 Mao Zedong, “On the Ten Great Relationships,” in Chairman Mao Talks to the People; Talks and 
Letters: 1956-1971, ed. Stuart Schram (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 74.  As cited in John W. 
Garver, Protracted Contest:  Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle:  University of 
Washington Press, 2001), 36.   
19 “The Truth about How the Leaders of the CPSU Have Allied Themselves with India against 
China,” Peking Review 45 (1965).  As cited in John W. Garver, Protracted Contest:  Sino-Indian Rivalry in 
the Twentieth Century (Seattle:  University of Washington Press, 2001), 57. 
9 
question.  In the opinion of the Indian government, Tibet is theirs.”20  In short, Beijing 
went to war with New Delhi for two reasons.  One is the “perceived need to punish and 
[to] end Indian efforts” in undermining Beijing’s control over Tibet, and the other is the 
“perceived need to punish and [to] end perceived Indian aggression against Chinese 
territory” along the Sino-Indian border.21  The “timing” of the 1962 war may have been 
calculated by Mao to redirect the Chinese people’s focus away from his disastrous Great 
Leap Forward campaign.  Additionally, the two superpowers were unlikely to intervene, 
as Washington and Moscow were focused on the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.22 
2. 1998 Indian Nuclear Test   
Sino-Indian normalization accelerated after Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s 
historical visit to Beijing in 1988, but Operation Shakti in May 1998 disrupted this 
warming trend.  The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Zhu Bangzao 
expressed Beijing’s “deep concern” over the initial nuclear test conducted by New Delhi 
and that it was not beneficial to peace and stability in the Asian subcontinent.  However, 
Beijing’s response to New Delhi’s second nuclear test was not as controlled when New 
Delhi used the “China threat” and Beijing’s alleged nuclear assistance to Islamabad as 
justifications to Washington for conducting its second nuclear test.  Beijing strongly 
disapproved of New Delhi for its second nuclear test, stating that New Delhi’s action “is 
nothing but outrageous contempt for the common will of the international community for 
the comprehensive ban on nuclear test and a hard blow [for global efforts] to prevent 
nuclear proliferation.  [New Delhi] will entail serious consequences to the peace and 
                                                 
20 Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (Long live Mao Zedong thought), in “Miscellany of Mao Tse-dong 
Thought (1949-1968),” pt. 2, no. 61269 (February 20, 1974), Joint Publication Research Services, 573.  As 
cited in John W. Garver, Protracted Contest:  Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle:  
University of Washington Press, 2001), 59. 
21 John W. Garver, “China’s Decision for War with India,” in New Directions in the Study of China’s 
Foreign Policy, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Palo Alto:  Stanford University Press, 2006), 
87. 
22 Susan L. Shirk, “One-Sided Rivalry:  China’s Perceptions and Policies toward India,” in The India-
China Relationship:  What the United States Needs to Know, ed.  Francine R. Frankel & Harry Harding, 
(Washington, D.C.:  Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), 75-100.   
10 
stability in South Asia and the world….”23  Beijing also expressed regret and 
disappointment over Islamabad’s decision to conduct nuclear test but “blamed India as 
the instigator of the South Asian nuclear crisis.”24  In retaliation, Beijing allied with 
Washington and headed the passage of a UN Security Council resolution “to compound 
denial of India’s nuclear status with punitive international isolations.”25 
Aside from expressing outrage through official statements, commentary sections 
of the government-sponsored People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) and the PLA’s authoritative 
newspaper (Jiefangju Bao) called for international actions against New Delhi.  These 
commentaries perceived the “China threat” theory as New Delhi’s drive to dominate 
South Asia and concluded, “…the root cause of India’s actions was a desire to bolster its 
alleged quest for hegemony in the region.”  One of these commentaries further carried 
personal attacks on Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes, who had supposedly 
given “smiling assurances” regarding the “peaceful and stable” border disputes to the 
PLA Chief of Staff Fu Quanyou, who had just returned from New Delhi before the 
nuclear test.  The other commentary went after Indian Prime Minister Vajapyee, who 
reportedly disclosed to President Clinton in a published letter, “tracing the Chinese threat 
to Chinese aggression in the 1962 Sino-Indian border war.”  This second commentator 
accused New Delhi for its “extremely ignominious role in the Tibet issue” by allowing 
the Dalai Lama to conduct “separatist activities” in India and that New Delhi “owe the 
Chinese people an apology.”26 
According to a Beijing-sponsored media outlet directed at overseas Chinese, 
PLA’s Jiefangju Bao dedicated a full page targeting New Delhi’s “military 
                                                 
23 Jing-dong Yuan, “India’s Rise after Pokhran II: Chinese Analyses and Assessments,” Asian Survey 
41 (2001):  979. 
24 Ibid, 979-980.   
25 Susan L. Shirk, “One-Sided Rivalry:  China’s Perceptions and Policies toward India,” in The India-
China Relationship:  What the United States Needs to Know, ed.  Francine R. Frankel & Harry Harding 
(Washington, D.C.:  Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), 75-100.  Also see Yong Deng, “Reputation and 
the Security Dilemma:  China Reacts to the China Threat Theory,” in New Directions in the Study of 
China’s Foreign Policy, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, (Palo Alto:  Stanford University 
Press, 2006), 197. 
26 This is taken from the review in “PRC on India Tests.”  The People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) and 
Jiefanjung Bao articles were published promptly by Xinhua and carried by FBIS (internet version).  As 
cited in Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Policy Priorities and Their Implications for the United States (Lanham, 
MD:  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 137-138. 
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expansionism” and “ambition of seeking regional hegemony.”  One such article 
purportedly detailed New Delhi’s military spending and weapons programs, as well as, its 
possession of intermediate-range nuclear-capable missiles that could reach southern 
China.  This article further claimed that New Delhi had “intensified efforts to make war 
preparation” since the Cold War ended, and that such effort “was a means of attaining 
New Delhi’s strategic goal of dominating South Asia, containing China, controlling the 
Indian Ocean, and becoming a major military power.”  Despite the criticisms from 
Beijing, these commentaries also noted the progress both sides have made in improving 
Sino-Indian relations and urged New Delhi to stop actions that would result in further 
damages.27  This suggests that Beijing was cautious of not letting history repeat itself vis-
à-vis the 1962 border conflict.  However, in spite of Beijing’ signal, “one should not 
conclude that China will ignore the seriousness of the threat posed by India’s nuclear 
weapons in the future…”28 
B. NEW DELHI’S VIEW OF BEIJING 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had hoped that Beijing and New Delhi would 
create a partnership “in constructing a new Asian order…which would make a vast 
difference to the whole set-up and balance of the world.”29  New Delhi’s 
“appeasement”30 to Beijing included lobbying for Beijing’s entry into the UN, and 
supporting Beijing’s stance on the Korean Peninsula.  Nehru went as far as coining the 
phrase “India and China are brothers,” or “Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai” in Hindi.  However, 
New Delhi’s eagerness to please Beijing ultimately backfired, which forced New Delhi to 
shift its “China policy,” and New Delhi eventually declared war against Beijing over 
territorial disputes. 
                                                 
27 This is taken from the review in “PRC on India Tests.”  The People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) and 
Jiefanjung Bao articles were published promptly by Xinhua and carried by FBIS (internet version).  As 
cited in Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Policy Priorities and Their Implications for the United States (Lanham, 
MD:  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 137-138. 
28 Lei Guang, “From National Identity to National Security:  China’s Changing Responses toward 
India in 1962 and 1998,” The Pacific Review 17 (2004):  415. 
29 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest:  Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle:  
University of Washington Press, 2001), 48-50. 
30 John W. Garver characterizes New Delhi’s eagerness to please Beijing as “appeasement.” 
12 
1.   1962 Sino-Indian War  
 In New Delhi’s view, national security interests are far more important than its 
cultural interest vis-à-vis Tibet.  New Delhi’s strategy in protecting the Tibetan buffer 
zone, in preserving Tibetan autonomy, and in minimizing PLA presence in Tibet was to 
“…avoid confrontations, and befriending the PRC” to persuade Beijing that such action 
was unnecessary.31  This was also Nehru’s strategy of avoiding large defense 
expenditures due to the lack of funds, as well as, his fear of a militarized India.  New 
Delhi’s “Tibet strategy” led to the 1954 agreement, in which New Delhi agreed to accept 
Beijing’s sovereignty over Tibet and recognition of Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence (or Panch Shila in Hindi).  New Delhi’s acceptance of “China’s Tibet” also 
was partly influenced by the 1951 Seventeen Point Agreement between Beijing and 
Tibet.  In what Nehru perceived was a “gentleman’s deal” (the 1954 agreement), Nehru 
was under the impression that Beijing had implicitly agreed to New Delhi’s position vis-
à-vis the border, and therefore there was no need to secure a separate formal agreement 
on such issue.32  Also central to the 1954 agreement was New Delhi’s perception of 
Beijing’s unspoken agreement to preserve “substantial de facto Tibetan autonomy.”  New 
Delhi felt “betrayed” when Tibetan autonomy diminished under Beijing’s control.33  In 
Indian nationalist opinion, the deepest offense regarding the Chinese control of Tibet is 
the perceived destruction of “India-derived Tibetan civilization” and “the fundamental 
Tibetan approach to life [which] reflected Indian aspiration.”34   
 Sino-Indian relations appeared to have deteriorated as Beijing asserted a tight grip 
over Tibet and successfully suppressed Tibetan insurgency.  Issues that were previously 
                                                 
31 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest:  Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle:  
University of Washington Press, 2001), 48-50. 
32 Dawa Norbu, “Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations:  The Centrality of Marginality,” Asian Survey 37 
(1997):  1078-95.  Dr. Norbu was a Tibetan-in-exile in India who received his Ph.D. from UC Berkley.  He 
was a professor in Central Asian Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi.  As cited in 
Sumit Ganguly, “India and China:  Border Issues, Domestic Integration, and International Security,” in The 
India-China Relationship:  What the United States Needs to Know, ed.  Francine R. Frankel & Harry 
Harding (Washington, D.C.:  Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), 106-109. 
33 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest:  Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle:  
University of Washington Press, 2001), 51-52. 
34 Ibid., 39-40. 
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deemed as insignificant became priorities.  New Delhi’s “China policy” shifted 
drastically when Beijing refused New Delhi’s demand to withdrawal PLA troops from 
the disputed territory of Aksai Chin.  In New Delhi’s view, Aksai Chin is an extension of 
Indian-controlled Kashmir, and the PLA had illegally occupied Indian territory with the 
construction of Xinjiang-Tibet Highway in 1957.  When Nehru complained to Zhou Enlai 
about PLA’s direct intrusion into Indian territory, Zhou insisted that the area where 
Xinjiang-Tibet Highway was constructed belongs to China, contrary to his earlier 
response to Nehru in 1954.35   
 After New Delhi’s swift rejection of Beijing’s “informal offer” for a 
comprehensive compromise settlement of the boundary in 1960, New Delhi implemented 
a “forward policy,” which involved sending small contingents of lightly-armed Indian 
troops into the disputed areas of both Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, in the hopes 
that the presence of Indian troops would compel the PLA to withdrawal.  This policy, in 
the words of one senior Indian general, “…had neither teeth nor tail” due to the lack of 
weaponry and the lack of logistical support36, which were all consequences of New 
Delhi’s defense policy. 
 The PLA’s attacks on Indian troops in the disputed territories left New Delhi in 
shock and took away any delusions New Delhi had on its friendship with Beijing, as well 
as, its dependency on geography as natural barriers against invasion.37  Nehru died in 
office two years later, and his daughter, Indira Gandhi, blamed the Chinese for her 
father’s death.  New Delhi learned a hard lesson from this humiliating defeat, both in the 
loss of lives and in national pride.  Consequently, New Delhi shifted its defense policy by 
accelerating its force modernization in all aspects, including actively seeking defense 
cooperation with the superpowers.   
                                                 
35 Sumit Ganguly, “India and China:  Border Issues, Domestic Integration, and International 
Security,” in The India-China Relationship:  What the United States Needs to Know, ed.  Francine R. 
Frankel & Harry Harding (Washington, D.C.:  Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), 111-112. 
36 Ibid., 111-114.  Sumit Ganguly’s interview with a senior retired Indian general in New Delhi, July 
1988.  Also see Lorne J. Kavic, India’s Quest for Security:  Defence Policies, 1947-1965 (Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1967). 
37 Ibid., 114-115. 
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2. 1998 Indian Nuclear Test   
Following the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict and China’s first nuclear test, Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi “expressed interest in nuclear deterrence provided by the 
superpowers” as a way to counter China.38  While many speculated the timing of 
Operation Shakti had to do with the Pakistani missile test and a provision of the 1996 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), others believe it had to do with BJP, New 
Delhi’s newly-elected political party at the time.  Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had a 
long-standing “Great India” policy:  “Great powers have nuclear weapons and so must 
India.”39   
Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes publicly commented that Chinese 
activities in South Asia had begun to “encircle” India.  Beijing was New Delhi’s 
“potential threat number one” because “China has provided Pakistan with both missile as 
well as nuclear know-how,” and “it [China] has its nuclear weapons stockpiled in Tibet 
right along our borders.”  He further stated that New Delhi should discard its “careless 
and casual attitude” towards its national security and be serious about making “real 
economic sacrifices” to prepare against Beijing’s military threat.40  The BJP spokesman 
Jag Mohan defended Fernandes’ position during a Lok Sabha debate:  “We only …want 
to remain prepared….This is the basic issue….We only want that when we sit at the 
negotiation table they [China and Pakistan] should not get the impression that we are a 
weak nation and we can be pushed around.”  Even the opposition party did not refute the 
“China threat”; instead, the Congress Party only pointed out that “India’s leaders ought 
not to talk openly and recklessly about such challenges.”41 
Prime Minister Vajpayee conveyed the same view but in a less-direct manner in 
his May 12, 1998 letter to President Clinton.  In this letter, Vajpayee stated that New 
                                                 
38 Paul F. Power, “The Indo-American Nuclear Controversy,” Asian Survey 19 (1979):  577.   
39 Walter Andersen, “Recent Trends in Indian Foreign Policy,” Asian Survey 40 (2001):  772. 
40 “India’s New Defense Chief Sees Chinese Military Threat,” New York Times, May 5, 1998.  As 
cited in John W. Garver, Protracted Contest:  Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle:  
University of Washington Press, 2001), 336.   
41 Lok Sabha Debates, May 27, 1998, sess. 2 (Budget).  As cited in John W. Garver, Protracted 
Contest:  Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle:  University of Washington Press, 2001), 
338-339.   
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Delhi had faced “for some years past” a “deteriorating security environment, especially 
the nuclear environment….We have an overt nuclear weapon state [China] on our 
borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962.  Although our 
relations have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly 
due to the unresolved border problem.”  In addition, this “overtly nuclear neighbor” had 
also “helped another neighbor of ours [Pakistan] to become a covert nuclear weapons 
state [which had also] attacked India three times in the last fifty years…..For the last ten 
years we have been the victims of unremitting terrorism and militancy sponsored by it.”42 
In spite of increased international criticisms instigated by Beijing and the 
inevitable Washington-imposed economic sanctions, New Delhi was determined not to 
back down and continued to reiterate its “China threat” belief.  As if to add fuel to the 
fire, Vajpayee met with the Dalai Lama as Sino-Indian relations deteriorated in the 
aftermath of Operation Shakti, which was, as expected, met with strong condemnation 
from Beijing as “interference in China’s domestic affairs,” which violated New Delhi’s 
promise of not allowing the Dalai Lama to engage in “anti-China activities in India” and, 
as a result, caused “deep resentment” among the Chinese people.43 
As Washington attempted to re-engage New Delhi in the aftermath of its 1998 
nuclear test, Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh told Deputy Secretary of 
State Strobe Talbott:  “Our problem is China.  We are not seeking parity with China. …. 
What we are seeking is a minimum deterrent.”44   
C. WASHINGTON’S VIEW OF BEIJING AND NEW DELHI 
 The purpose of this section is to answer the second question, “What is 
Washington’s view of Sino-Indian relations?” posed earlier.  Washington viewed both 
                                                 
42 The text of this letter is in New York Times, May 13, 1998, sec. A12.  As cited in John W. Garver, 
Protracted Contest:  Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle:  University of Washington 
Press, 2001), 336-337. 
43 AFP, Hong Kong, October 22, 1998, in FBIS, DRC, no. 98-295.  As cited in John W. Garver, 
Protracted Contest:  Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle:  University of Washington 
Press, 2001), 77. 
44 John Burns, “India’s Line in the Sand:  ‘Minimum’ Nuclear Deterrent against China,” International 
Herald Tribune, July 8, 1998.  As cited in John W. Garver, Protracted Contest:  Sino-Indian Rivalry in the 
Twentieth Century (Seattle:  University of Washington Press, 2001), 338. 
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Beijing and New Delhi in the context of the Cold War.  Beijing to Moscow was what 
New Delhi was to Islamabad.  The only difference lies in scale; the former is global 
strategic while the latter is continental strategic in South Asia.45  This view was also 
reflected in the U. S. foreign policy in the 1950s.   
In spite of Indian Ambassador K. M. Panikkar’s warning of possible Chinese 
involvement in the Korean War46, neither President Truman nor General MacArthur took 
the warning seriously, as President Truman viewed it as “a bold attempt to blackmail the 
United Nations.”  According to President Truman’s Memoirs, “Mr. Panikkar had in the 
past played the game of the Chinese Communists fairly regularly, so that his statement 
could not be taken as that of an impartial observer.”47   
Even so, Washington’s aversion for Beijing increased as its troops became 
involved in the Korean War, its support for the communist Viet Minh, as well as, its 
instigation of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis.  New Delhi, on the other hand, despite 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ dislike for its non-aligned movement rhetoric, 
benefited from substantial economic aid from the Eisenhower administration, for 
President Eisenhower saw New Delhi’s political neutrality as an advantage.  Washington 
sided with New Delhi in the Sino-Indian border dispute, as evidenced by President 
Eisenhower’s unprecedented visit to New Delhi in 1959, at the onset of the declining 
Sino-Indian relations.  The 1962 Sino-Indian War coincided with the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, a proxy war between the two superpowers.  Upon the arrival of U.S. naval forces 
in the Bay of Bengal, Beijing’s sudden unilateral cease fire prevented Washington from 
intervening in this conflict.48 
                                                 
45 Harry Harding, “The Evolution of the Strategic Triangle:  China, India, and the United States,” in 
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However, in spite of Washington’s show of support for New Delhi, New Delhi’s 
suspicion of the U.S.-Pakistan ties precluded further development of the U.S.-India 
bilateral relations.  Washington provided more advanced arms packages to Islamabad as 
compared to New Delhi, as well as, its continued support of Islamabad over New Delhi 
on Kashmir.  Nevertheless, Washington did so for two reasons.  One was New Delhi’s 
objection over Washington’s position on Vietnam and nonproliferation, and the other was 
to prevent the inevitable China-Pakistan alliance, which Beijing was eager to form as a 
way to inflict further damage to New Delhi’s wound in the aftermath of the 1962 border 
conflict.49   
The 1970s saw a dramatic realignment of the Cold War blocs.  In response, 
Washington shifted from containment to détente during the “Kissinger era.”50  With the 
Sino-Soviet split and the U.S.-China rapprochement, New Delhi and Moscow converged 
on common grounds.  The 1971 India-Soviet treaty of peace and friendship was signed 
shortly after National Security Advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger visited Beijing.  In 
Washington’s view, this took away India’s political neutrality and placed New Delhi in 
the Soviets’ communist camp.  The tense relationship between Indira Gandhi and 
President Nixon only exaggerated this view and contributed to the deterioration of U.S.-
India ties.  Meanwhile, Washington stepped up its courtship with Islamabad to minimize 
Moscow’s influence in South Asia, and to deter New Delhi’s efforts in dominating the 
region.  Washington resumed arms sales to Islamabad and welcomed strengthened Sino-
Pakistan ties.  Rather than a strategy of countering New Delhi, Beijing was cautious in 
justifying its growing ties with Islamabad as “containing the expansion of Soviet 
influence in Central Asia.”  Some U.S. analysts argue that it was in this context that 
Beijing began to support Islamabad’s nuclear weapons program.51 
                                                 
49 Harry Harding, “The Evolution of the Strategic Triangle:  China, India, and the United States,” in 
The India-China Relationship:  What the United States Needs to Know, ed.  Francine R. Frankel & Harry 
Harding (Washington, D.C.:  Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), 328-329. 
50 Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 17th ed. 
(Washington, D.C.:  CQ Press, 2007), 137-140. 
51 Harry Harding, “The Evolution of the Strategic Triangle:  China, India, and the United States,” in The India-
China Relationship:  What the United States Needs to Know, ed.  Francine R. Frankel & Harry Harding (Washington, 
D.C.:  Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), 329-331.  
18 
 The end of the Cold War not only brought triumph to Washington but also forced 
New Delhi and Beijing to navigate in previously unfamiliar waters.  Despite increased 
flows of U.S. foreign direct investment, the U.S.-China relations suffered a major set 
back from the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.  New Delhi, on the other hand, 
suffered a major domestic crisis of its own; its inability to meet its financial obligations 
nearly bankrupted the country.  The Rao-Singh market reform in 1991 revived the Indian 
economy by devaluing the rupee, removed the stifling license system, lowered tariffs, and 
encouraged foreign direct investments in India.52  Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s 
Washington visit in 1994, aimed at attracting U.S. foreign direct investments to New 
Delhi, marked the starting point of the improved U.S.-India bilateral relations.53  
Nevertheless, New Delhi’s decision to conduct its 1998 nuclear test, Operation Shakti, 
resulted in the U.S.-imposed economic sanctions in accordance with the 1994 Nuclear 
Proliferation Prevention Act. 
 Some in the United States believe that New Delhi’s perceptions of the “China 
threat” are well-justified.  The unresolved territorial disputes from the 1962 war, the 
Chinese military presence in Myanmar, Sino-Pakistan relations, and their fundamental 
disagreement on the status of Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal, and Kashmir represent a serious 
possibility for another Sino-Indian military conflict.54   
 The 1998 nuclear test took place just as Washington and Beijing were seeking “a 
new strategic rationale…to replace the common opposition to Soviet expansion…in the 
1970s,” and to overcome their differences in human rights, trade, and the 1995-1996 
Taiwan Strait Crisis.  The joint U.S.-China statement on the 1998 South Asian Crisis, 
issued during President Clinton’s visit to Beijing, appeared to signal this realignment.55 
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In response to the first question, Sino-Indian relations in the decade leading up to 
their 1962 border conflict can be described as friendly, although each had their own 
agendas.  The Cold War played a role in the continued Sino-Indian hostilities in the 
1960s and the 1970s, as Beijing severed its ties with Moscow and formed new ones with 
Washington and Islamabad, while New Delhi developed its friendship with Moscow.  
Sino-Indian normalization coincided with the ending of the Cold War and the demise of 
the Soviet Union.  India’s 1998 nuclear test brought unusually strong reaction from 
Beijing, but it did not stop the two from resuming their diplomatic relations after the 1998 
South Asian Crisis.   
Both Beijing and New Delhi wanted what they considered as rightfully theirs 
based on their self-perceived “cultural greatness” and for their own benefits (resources 
and security).  Disputed frontier boundaries in desolate locations with multiple cultural 
influences are an opportunity for conflict.  New Delhi’s military weakness was exposed 
in the 1962 war and resulted in its drive for the ultimate weapon.  Beijing’s claim to all 
lands that may have ever been under its self-perceived sphere of influence is a major test 
of today’s international system.  The topic of unspoken or undocumented agreements 
being broken is a weakness of New Delhi’s in its dealings with Beijing (and a lesson for 
others).  The problem of less than complete documentation and agreements of intentions 
is again illustrated as an opportunity for conflict.   In answering the second question, 
Washington’s desire for stability in this ancient but new born region magnified the 
problem of changing alliances.  The regional shifting shades of grey in a White vs. Black 
Cold War world allowed the introduction of nuclear weapons to an area far distant from 
American shores.  The goal of non-proliferation could only slow, not stop, the spread of 
such weapons. 
In Washington’s calculation, as reflected in the U.S. foreign policy during the 
Cold War, Beijing was more important than New Delhi.  But now, nearly two decades 
after the end of the Cold War, New Delhi is as important as Beijing.  In fact, it is 
important enough to counter a rising China, according to Washington’s calculation.  The 
next chapter will unfold the U.S.-India strategic partnership.  Although none of the five 
20 
questions will be answered in this chapter, Chapter III provides essential background  
needed to understand the significance of what Washington is willing to do in exchange to 
“partner-up” with New Delhi, which indirectly shows New Delhi’s elevated importance 
in Washington’s foreign policy calculations. 
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III. UNFOLDING THE U.S.-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
 The purpose of this chapter is to reveal the four areas of U.S.-India strategic 
cooperation:  security, high-technology trade, space, and nuclear cooperation.  Emphasis 
will be placed on the nuclear cooperation, as it is the focus of this thesis.  Reaction from 
Islamabad will also be covered, as New Delhi and Islamabad have been archrivals since 
their independence, and New Delhi also cited Beijing’s alleged assistance in Islamabad’s 
nuclear program as one of the reasons behind the 1998 nuclear test.  None of the five 
questions will be answered directly in this chapter, but material presented in this chapter 
is relevant in answering the remaining three questions in the following chapters, as well 
as, the major question of this thesis. 
In an attempt to bring New Delhi closer to Washington’s arms control and 
nonproliferation goals, the fourteen-round Talbott-Singh dialogue took place in seven 
different countries over a period of two years.56  Washington’s support for New Delhi 
over Islamabad during the 1999 Kargil Crisis signaled a shift in Washington’s Indian 
policy and marked the beginning of U.S.-India rapprochement.57  President Clinton and 
Prime Minister Vajpayee’s reciprocal visits in 2000 further elevated the bilateral 
relations. 
 Although the Clinton administration laid the ground work for U.S.-India 
rapprochement, then governor of Texas George W. Bush had already showed an interest 
in forging alliance with India before winning his bid for the White House.  After being 
briefed by his team of foreign policy advisors (led by Dr. Condoleezza Rice) in the spring 
of 1999, then Governor Bush asked “What about India?  …  A billion people in a 
functioning democracy.  Isn’t it something?  Isn’t it something?”  Dr. Rice later wrote 
that China should be viewed as a “strategic competitor” rather than a “strategic partner,” 
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and suggested that the United States redirect its focus and “pay closer attention to India’s 
role in the regional balance…[there is a ] strong tendency to connect India with Pakistan 
and …Kashmir or the nuclear competition…. India is an element in China’s calculation, 
and it should be America’s, too.  India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to 
emerge as one.”58   
The tragic events of 9/11 presented a perfect opportunity for the Bush 
administration to create “a new new world order” by enhancing New Delhi’s international 
role as an emerging power capable of countering China’s rise.59  This chapter discusses 
the “quartet”--the four controversial areas of the U.S.-India strategic cooperation, and it is 
comprised of four sections:  The four areas of strategic cooperation with emphasis on the 
nuclear deal, reactions from Pakistan, and the chapter summary. 
A. THE FOUR AREAS OF STRATEGIC COOPERATION 
 During an interview, then Secretary of State General Powell referred to the 
“basket of issues” from New Delhi as the “trinity”:  “How could you help us?  How can 
we expand our trade in high tech areas, in areas having to do with space launch 
activities, and with our nuclear industry?”60  The “trinity” later became the “quartet” 
when missile defense was included as part of the bilateral strategic cooperation.61  The 
now-concluded Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative allowed for the 
opening of “dialogue and build trust on a number of sensitive areas, including high-
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technology trade, civil nuclear cooperation, space, and missile defense.”62  Although the 
bilateral strategic partnership encompasses a wide range of issues ranging from a 
commitment to promote democracy to a pledge to reduce intellectual property piracy and 
to promote public health; unsurprisingly, the “quartet” turned out to be the essence of the 
bilateral strategic partnership.   
1. Security Cooperation   
 The security cooperation pillar consists of three sub-categories:  military-to-
military relations, arms sales, and missile defense.  The India-U.S. Defense Policy Group 
(DPG) has the broad oversight of U.S.-India bilateral security cooperation.  A ten-year 
defense contract, signed in 2005, calls for an unprecedented, multi-faceted interaction 
covering a wide range of issues such as increasing bilateral defense trade and 
collaboration in missile defense, expanding opportunities for technology transfers and 
joint-production, as well as, creating a bilateral Defense Procurement and Production 
Group.  In spite of the significant asymmetries on technology transfer, some experts 
praise Washington’s views of its defense relationship with New Delhi as “common 
principles and shared national interests.”63  On the contrary, critics point out that Indian 
belief in nonalignment and multi-polarity will be a major obstacle for India to form any 
true strategic partnership with any country.64   
a. Military-to-Military Relations  
The U.S.-India military cooperation intensified after 9/11.  In 2003, the 
U.S. and Indian Special Forces held a high-altitude joint exercise in Ladakh for “inter-
operability” between the two armies.  According to the local commander who hosted this 
exercise, the terrain in Ladakh are unlike those available in the United States, and this 
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type of exercise indicates a new long-term strategic and military understanding between 
New Delhi and Washington.65  Ironically, Ladakh is the province where Aksai Chin is 
located; and Aksai Chin is one of the disputed territories that led to the 1962 Sino-Indian 
War.  The 2004 Cooperative Cope Thunder in Alaska was the Indian Air Forces’ first 
refueling mission outside India.  Likewise, the 2004 Cope India maneuvers at Gwalior 
were the Indian Air Force’s largest and longest air combat exercise with a foreign 
counterpart.  The Indian Air Force, despite of its older Soviet-supplied jets, outperformed 
its U.S. counterpart.66  The 2005 Cope India air exercise was the first bilateral exercise to 
involve Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft.  In addition, the Malabar naval 
exercise in September and October 2005 was the largest U.S.-India joint exercise, and the 
first to involve aircraft carriers from the two navies.  The two navies also demonstrated 
capabilities of responding jointly to emergencies at sea in a separate exercise conducted 
in the early part of 2006.  While the two navies were collaborating at sea, the two armies 
held a company-sized exercise in the foothills of the Himalayas,67 further demonstrating 
“joint-ness” in all branches of the two militaries. 
 A “spillover” of bilateral military cooperation is the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI) introduced by President Bush in 2003, and the 2004-2005 tsunami relief 
in Southeast Asia.  The PSI’s goal is to create multi-lateral cooperation on the 
interdiction of weapons of mass destructions (WMD)-related shipments.68  Under the 
PSI, 11 of more than 60 countries have committed to disrupt WMD trade.  New Delhi has 
not joined the PSI as of yet; but if it did, it would significantly extend the initiative’s 
reach.69 
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 Escalation in the cooperation of the two militaries, according to a report 
published by a Department of Defense-affiliated organization, is Washington’s aim to 
have a “capable partner” (i.e., New Delhi) to take on “more responsibility for low-end 
operations” in Asia.  This report, a compilation of interviews with 82 senior U.S. and 
Indian (mostly military) officials who are closely linked with the bilateral security 
relations, concludes that Washington’s objective in its strategic relationship with New 
Delhi is a “hedge” against losing significant allies in Asia, more explicitly, Japan and 
South Korea.70 
b. Arms Sales   
Equipment commonality”71 will certainly enhance the interoperability 
aspect of the future bilateral joint operations.  In 2002, Washington agreed to sell New 
Delhi 12 Firefinder radars (counter-battery radars) worth $190 million dollars.  New 
Delhi also purchased counterterrorism equipment for its special forces and top-of-the-line 
U.S.-made electronic ground sensors, worth $29 million, for the Kashmir region.  In 
2004, Congress was notified of a possible sale, worth up to $40 million, of aircraft self-
protection systems to be mounted on the aircraft that carry the Indian head of state.  
Additionally, Washington has agreed to sell New Delhi the jointly-developed U.S.-Israeli 
Phalcon airborne early-warning system, which may very well tilt the regional strategic 
balance.  The 2006 Congressional approval for the sale of the decommissioned USS 
Trenton to New Delhi was worth $44 million.  The former U.S. amphibious transport 
ship is now the second largest ship in the Indian Navy, the INS Jalashwa, commissioned 
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in June 2007.  New Delhi spent another $39 million for the purchase of six surplus 
Sikorsky UH-3H Sea King helicopters from Washington to go along with the INS 
Jalashwa.  In May 2007, Congress was notified of a potential sale of six C-130J Hercules 
military transport aircraft in excess of $1 billion dollars, the largest defense deal to New 
Delhi to date.72  
 New Delhi reportedly has a wish list of U.S. made weapons, to include 
PAC-3 anti-missile systems, electronic warfare systems, and even combat aircraft.  
Washington has hinted that it is willing to entertain New Delhi’s requests on the possible 
purchase of F-16 or F/A-18 multi-role fighter jets, as well as, “the sale of transformative 
systems in areas such as command and control, early warning, and missile defense.”  
New Delhi is expected to issue a bid for 126 new fighter jets worth $9 billion dollars by 
the end of 2007, which arms dealers around the globe are expected to compete.73  
  Ironically, New Delhi has attempted to purchase the advanced Arrow 
Weapons System, an anti-missile system jointly developed by the United States and 
Israel, from Jerusalem instead of Washington.  Despite the Pentagon’s willingness to 
approve the sale, the State Department is reluctant in supporting the sale, citing 
Washington’s obligations under Missile Technology Control Regime.  As of the writing 
of this thesis, Washington has not approved the sale of this particular weapons system to 
New Delhi.74 
c. Missile Defense   
President Bush initiated his call for missile defense with New Delhi 
months before 9/11.  Nearly six years later, progress on missile defense has been slow.  
Indian experts have attended briefings in Colorado in 2002, followed by attendance in the 
multilateral ballistic missile defense conferences in Kyoto and Berlin in 2003, as well as, 
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observed the U.S. Roving Sands missile maneuvers in Berlin in July 2004.75  Washington 
has gone only as far as discussing potential sales on such systems with New Delhi and 
not finalized any direct sales between the two.  Meanwhile, New Delhi’s failed attempt in 
circumventing Washington in the purchase of the Arrow system from Jerusalem is one 
that would raise concerns on the motives behind New Delhi’s decisions in approaching 
Jerusalem vice Washington, its strategic partner.   
 Indian Defense Minister once said that New Delhi has no intentions of 
“accepting a missile shield from anyone.” Some Indian defense analysts have warned 
against the purchase, citing the high probability of ineffectiveness of U.S.-made systems 
and the potential insecurities that it would bring to the region.76   
2. High-Technology Trade   
The high-tech trade pillar consists of dual-use high-technology goods, 
specifically, those with both civilian and military applications.  Since its 1998 nuclear 
test, a number of Indian organizations have appeared on the U.S. export control “Entity 
List” as foreign end users implicated in weapons proliferation activities.  As part of the 
NSSP initiative, seven Indian organizations were subsequently removed from the Entity 
List, including the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO).  The U.S.-India High-
Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) was created in 2003 as a forum to facilitate the 
bilateral high-technology trade.  The “Trusted Customer” program, designed to facilitate 
more bilateral high-technology trade, was introduced in 2006.  The majority of dual-use 
licensing applications for New Delhi are approved.77  In fact, less than 1 percent of total 
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U.S. exports to India have licensing requirements, down from 24 percent in 1999.  
Bilateral trade has reached $32 billion and is expected to double by 2010.78 
3. Civil Space Cooperation  
Civil space cooperation is the third pillar of the bilateral strategic partnership, as 
New Delhi is reportedly to have been seeking American space technology since the 
1960s.  The NSSP initiative called for bilateral cooperation on “the peaceful uses of space 
technology,” and the Bush-Singh July 2005 Joint Statement further called for “closer ties 
in space exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and in the commercial space arena.”  
In 2006, Washington and New Delhi agreed to the “launch of U.S. satellites and satellites 
containing U.S. components by Indian space launch vehicles.”  This agreement later 
expanded to include two U.S. scientific instruments on India’s Chandrayaan lunar 
mission scheduled for 2007.79 
With foreign assistance, New Delhi started developing its intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM) capability as early as the 1960s.  The U.S., Russia, England, France, and 
China (the permanent-five members of the United Nations Security Council) use a 
ballistic missile as a space launch vehicle, while New Delhi chose to modify a space 
launch vehicle into a ballistic missile.  Paul Wolfowitz is reportedly to have compared 
space launch vehicles to “peaceful nuclear explosives” (PNEs), since both have civilian 
applications, as well as, hardware and technology with military applications.  New Delhi 
has exhibited this “interchangeability” with both the space launch vehicle and the 
PNEs.80  Secretary of State General Powell once commented that certain red lines with 
respect to proliferation need to be protected because it’s “hard to separate within space 
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launch activities…and nuclear programs…which could go to weapons…and which could 
be solely for peaceful purposes…”81   
Although New Delhi neither officially confirms nor denies the existence of its 
ICBM program82, Indian analysts generally cite status as a world power and the ability to 
counter the “high-tech aggression” as demonstrated in the first Iraq War as the two 
reasons for pursuing an ICBM capability.83  The first reason given is straight forward and 
easily understood.  The second reason, contrary to the first, is quite troublesome and, 
frankly, provoking.  The second reason implies that Washington employed “high-tech 
aggression” during the 1990-1991 Iraq war, and it is Washington’s ability that New Delhi 
seeks to counter in the event of a conflict.  The Surya-2 has a reported range of 12,000 
km, capable of reaching the United States.  The Surya-1 has a range of up to 5,000 km 
and is capable of reaching China.84   
The question now becomes:  Does Washington want history to repeat itself vis-à-
vis its space technology transfer/assistance to Beijing during the Reagan administration?  
Beijing stunned the international community with its first successful anti-satellite missile 
test in January 2007.  While Beijing’s intentions behind its anti-satellite test remain 
undisclosed, it is highly possible that the U.S.-India Civil Space Cooperation has a great 
deal to do with it.  New Delhi is already developing an ICBM capable of targeting the 
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United States.  Any assistance to aid New Delhi’s ambition in its space exploration could 
potentially backfire on Washington in the future.   
4. Civil Nuclear Cooperation   
Civil nuclear cooperation is undoubtedly the corner stone of the bilateral strategic 
partnership, and the most controversial one of the four areas.  As Under Secretary of 
State Nicholas Burns told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “India has made this 
[nuclear cooperation] the central issue in the new partnership developing between our 
countries.”85  According to this agreement, Washington agrees to acknowledge New 
Delhi as a globally-responsible possessor of nuclear weapons.  In return, New Delhi 
agrees to “assume the same responsibility and practices” as if it were a NPT state, 
separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities, place two-thirds of its current civilian 
reactors (14 out of 22) under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection and 
keep the remaining for military use, as well as extending its moratorium on nuclear 
testing.86 
In December 2006, President Bush signed the “Henry J. Hyde United States-India 
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006” (aka, the “India deal,” or the “U.S.-
India nuclear deal”), which legalized the export of nuclear technology and fuel to New 
Delhi despite the fact that New Delhi is not a signatory to the 1968 Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).  Despite the passing of the Hyde Act,  the “India 
deal” is still as controversial today as the day it was announced, both at home and abroad.  
The next section will cover both the supporters and the opponents’ views, from both the 
United States and India, on the contentious “India deal.” 
B. THE “INDIA DEAL” 
The Bush administration emphasizes that this deal benefits the United States in 
five major areas.  First, it benefits our security by bringing India “into the 
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nonproliferation mainstream;” second, it benefits our consumers by reducing pressures on 
global energy markets, specifically carbon-based fuels; third, it benefits the environment 
by reducing carbon emissions/green house gases; fourth, it benefits U.S. business 
interests through sales of nuclear reactors, fuel, and auxiliary services to India; and 
finally, it enhances the progress of the broader U.S.-India “global partnership.”87   
It appears that, from what the Bush administration is advertising, America stands 
to benefit more than India from this nuclear deal simply by recognizing New Delhi as a 
nuclear power.  If so, then why did it set off a storm in the nonproliferation world?  And 
if all New Delhi has to do is agree to be a pseudo-NPT state, place its civilian reactors 
under IAEA inspections, and agree to no more nuclear testing, then why is the Singh 
government having a hard time selling it to his Parliament?  The next two sections will 
closely examine arguments from both sides of the camp on the pros and cons of this 
nuclear deal. 
1. Supporters from the United States and India    
The main supporters of the deal88 in the United States, along side the Bush 
administration’s rhetoric, appear to be offering explanations that focus on the big picture.  
Ashley J. Tellis, one of the principle architects of the deal and a senior associate at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says this deal provides New Delhi with a 
back-up plan in the event that its indigenous nuclear plan falls short of expectations, and 
this is not “a closet atoms for war” effort that would lead to the growth of New Delhi’s 
nuclear arsenal, which would exacerbate the potential arms race with Beijing and 
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Islamabad.89  Sumit Ganguly, a noted Indian-American scholar and the Director of the 
India Studies Program at Indiana University in Bloomington argues that this agreement 
enables New Delhi to address its energy needs, reduce the dangers of nuclear accidents at 
obsolete nuclear facilities, and solidifies its alliance with the world’s superpower, the 
United States.90  Additionally, according to C. Raja Mohan, who is Strategic Affairs 
Editor at The Indian Express and a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board, 
this deal is “less about nuclear issues than it is about creating the basis for a true alliance 
between the United States and India—about India to work in the United States’ favor as 
the global balance of power shifts.”91  Supporters of the India deal proclaim the passage 
of the Hyde Act as “the most significant U.S. strategic development since the end of the 
Cold War.”92  To sum up, the supporters have neglected the first four areas of benefits 
claimed by the Bush administration and have chosen to concentrate on the fifth point, 
which is enhancing the broader U.S.-India strategic partnership.   
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2. Critics from the United States and India    
 While supporters of the deal focus on the balance of power and addressing New 
Delhi’s energy needs, critics of the U.S.-India nuclear deal93 have an abundance of 
counter-arguments ranging from technicalities dealing with nuclear weapons to strategic 
priorities of the United States.  First, this deal will not benefit our security by bringing 
New Delhi “into the nonproliferation mainstream.”  Henry Sokolski, Executive Director 
of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, DC who has also 
testified before Congress, insists that this deal will allow New Delhi to expand its civilian 
nuclear power program and free up its uranium to build more bombs.  More importantly, 
this deal violates Article I of the NPT, which prohibits states (i.e., the United States) from 
helping nuclear weapons efforts of those (i.e., India) that did not have nuclear weapons 
prior to the treaty’s completion.  Another equally important point is that “the Indian 
nuclear deal trades away our credibility on North Korea and Iran….the United States will 
be joining the ranks of North Korea and Iran as NPT violators.”94  Robert J. Einhorn, 
former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation from 1999-2001 and currently a 
senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, echoes the same 
concerns.95   
  Second, this deal does not benefit American consumers by way of stabilizing 
world energy markets from reduced Indian demands for oil, nor would it benefit the 
environment by reduced carbon emissions/green house gases.  An analysis done by John 
Stephenson and Peter Tynan, both are consultants in Dalberg’s Washington, DC office, 
concludes that the economic and resource arguments as claimed by the backers of the 
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India deal is overstated.  Nuclear energy is unlikely to reduce carbon emissions and is not 
the most significant option for reducing greenhouse gas.  In fact, nuclear energy will not 
reduce India’s dependence on oil and gas.  This conclusion nullifies the second and third 
so-called benefits.96   
  To support the invalidity of the second and third claimed benefits, nuclear energy 
will not substitute for most of the imported foreign fuels because the end uses are 
different in India.  As Ashton Carter of Harvard University wrote, nuclear power can help 
but will not be the answer in addressing India’s energy problems.  In the foreseeable 
future, India’s electricity will be generated from coal-burning power plants, and nuclear 
power will provide less than ten percent of the overall electricity output.  Therefore, 
“…[nuclear power] can do little to slake the thirst of the principle consuming sector in 
India—transportation—because cars and trucks do not run off the electrical grid and will 
not for a long time.”97  Michael Levi and Charles Furguson, both of the Council on 
Foreign Relations, further emphasized that “most Indian oil is used by cars and trucks, 
not by power plants, so nuclear power will not significantly change the demand for oil.”98  
To help in addressing India’s increased need for more and cleaner energy, says Henry 
Sokolski during testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, focus 
should be redirected to increase efficiencies in its consumption, distribution, and the 
generation of energy, which means a restructuring of New Delhi’s coal industry, curbing 
massive energy thefts and subsidies, as well as, expanding the use of renewable energy.99   
  Third, Washington’s strategic priorities are inverted because this deal sets 
precedence for Beijing to seek similar exemptions in the future, which further 
undermines Washington’s efforts in curbing China’s rise, according to George Perkovich, 
Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a 
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leading expert on India’s nuclear program.  Economic growth is the first and foremost 
determinant of both Indian and Chinese power and stability; the U.S.-India strategic 
partnership as a whole offers nothing significant to foster Indian economic growth.  
Besides, this deal will not “buy lasting Indian partnership” because the basis of the U.S.-
India strategic partnership is too shaky.100  Michael Krepon, another noted 
nonproliferation expert in the United States, shares the same concerns.101  This argument 
discounts the fifth so-called benefit and is a direct contrast of the supporters’ argument of 
focusing on the big picture. 
  In addition to strong domestic opposition in the United States, this deal has also 
generated its fair share of criticism in India.  Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic 
studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, points out that this deal could 
permanently poison the growing U.S.-India ties before the deal was announced.  More to 
the point, because only non-nuclear weapon states are subject to IAEA inspection, 
“discrimination is built into the deal” when New Delhi agrees to place its nuclear 
facilities under IAEA inspection.  To further dispute the second and the third benefits of 
the deal as claimed by the Bush administration, nuclear power will not help ease India’s 
energy demands because nuclear power plants take too long to build, and nuclear energy 
only makes up a tiny share of India’s total electricity demand.  Similarly, India does not 
use oil to generate electricity, so this deal will not decrease India’s oil dependence and 
help stabilize world oil prices.  Lastly, it’s all about the money: New Delhi has promised 
to import eight American reactors worth up to $20 billion within the next six years.  This 
deal will help revive U.S. nuclear power industry, which has not received a single reactor 
order in more than three decades.102  Chellaney’s last point, ironically, substantiates the 
fourth so-call benefit of the deal as advertised by the Bush administration:  it’s all about 
the money. 
                                                 
100 George Perkovich, “Faulty Promises, the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,”,” Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, September 2005.  www.carnegieendowment.org.  Date accessed:  January 25, 2007.   
101 Michael Krepon, “The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal: Another Wrong Turn in the War on Terror,”,” 
The Henry L. Stimson Center, March 29, 2006.  www.stimson.org.  Date accessed:  May 18, 2007.  Michael 
Krepon is Co-Founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center and a noted proliferation expert in the United States.   
102 Brahma Chellaney, “The Best of Intentions, the Worst of Results,”,” International Herald 
Tribune, June 26, 2006.  www.iht.com.  Date accessed: January 16, 2007.  Brahma Chellaney is a professor 
of strategic studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi.   
36 
  Even worse than disputing the so-called major benefits by New Delhi’s analysts is 
the domestic political opposition by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), one of New Delhi’s 
main political parties: .”..the stipulations [of this deal]…would ‘cap’ India’s nuclear 
program and ‘keep India in perpetual bondage’ to Washington.”103  The BJP has opposed 
this deal since it was announced in July 2005.  Two years after the deal was announced, 
Washington and New Delhi finally came to a consensus over a technical pact known as 
the 123 agreement, referring to Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954.  
Washington gave New Delhi just about everything it asked for, which suggests that 
Indian persistence prevailed over American impatience.   
  In spite of this, the Indian communist parties insist that this nuclear deal would 
allow Washington to influence New Delhi’s foreign policy and to control its treasured 
nuclear weapons program.  The Indian communist parties’ fundamental objection over 
this nuclear deal came from their broader ideology:  They don’t want New Delhi to lean 
towards Washington and they don’t want India to be a client state to the U.S., comments 
Sharad Joshi, a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies.104  As Basudeb Acharya, a top 
official of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) stated, “We must stand against a 
strategic partnership with the United States of America.”  He also called the Iraq war and 
Washington’s attempt in stopping Tehran’s nuclear weapons program “foreign policy 
adventures [that] we want no part of…”  Some opponents of the deal attempted to disrupt 
the Indian Parliament by shouting at Sing during his victory speech over the 123 
agreement:  .”..[this deal] is another step in our journey to regain our due place in global 
councils.”105 
  Besides objection over ideological differences between the two countries, critics 
in New Delhi have also stressed that the vagueness of the U.S.-India 123 agreement does 
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not specifically state New Delhi’s right to test nuclear weapons.  In addition, it makes no 
specific mention to the possible halt of the nuclear deal should New Delhi decide to test 
nuclear weapons in the future, suggesting that Washington’s goal is to terminate New 
Delhi’s nuclear weapons program.  However, the 123 agreement does explicitly 
acknowledge New Delhi’s right to stockpile and to reprocess nuclear fuel.  Although no 
parliamentary approval is required, the Singh government could collapse if the majority 
of his parliament walks out over their objection of the nuclear deal.  If so, it would “be a 
major setback to India’s international ambitions…[because]…India, without the help of 
the United States and or any other big power, will take much longer to be counted 
globally,” says retired Indian General Ashok Mehta.106   
  Regardless of the consensus over the 123 agreement, the nuclear deal still needs 
the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and the U.S. Congress approval by December 2007 
before it is complete, or else the deal will be dead and difficult to revive as the next 
presidential election will be in full swing after that.  While this chapter has so far 
provided an overview of the U.S.-India strategic cooperation with emphasis on the 
nuclear deal, it would not be balanced without covering reactions from Islamabad, which 
is covered in the following section. 
C. REACTIONS FROM PAKISTAN 
 The Bush administration justifies its decision not to extend the same courtesy to 
Pakistan by comparing the nonproliferation track record of New Delhi to that of 
Islamabad.  Differences between Washington and Islamabad remain over the legitimacy 
of the A. Q. Khan investigation, Washington’s perception of a lack of effort on the part of 
Islamabad in combating terrorism, and the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline.   
Pakistan has stood firm in its opposition to the U.S.-India nuclear deal since the 
very beginning and has disagreed with Washington over the “de-hyphenated [U.S.] South 
Asia policy.”107  A Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson stated, “Our relations with the 
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U.S. have their own dynamics and we do not have to compare what the U.S. does with 
other countries, but certainly if an exception is made for one country in the NSG, we 
would like that to be extended to Pakistan as well.”108   
Upon the announcement of the U.S.-India 123 agreement, the Pakistani National 
Command Authority cautioned that the nuclear deal would tilt the strategic balance in the 
Asian region.  Islamabad further cautioned that the India nuclear deal has “implications 
on strategic stability,” as it would allow New Delhi “to produce significant quantities of 
fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclear reactors….Strategic 
stability in south Asia and the global non-proliferation regime would have been better 
served if the U.S. had considered a package approach for Pakistan and India…with a 
view to preventing a nuclear arms race in the region.”109  As if it were sending a 
powerful message to Washington that it, too, has options, Islamabad has officially 
approached the NSG in seeking an equivalent of the “Indian exception” following the 
announcement of the U.S.-India 123 agreement.  Islamabad’s action appears to be in sync 
with Beijing’s efforts in crafting a set of special rules for non-NPT states.110 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 Washington’s “appeasement” of New Delhi is comparable to New Delhi’s 
appeasement of Beijing half a century ago.  The appearance of caving in to the majority 
of New Delhi’s demands shows Washington’s eagerness to act in the geopolitical balance 
of Asia and the unstated importance of both New Delhi and Beijing in the U.S. foreign 
policy priorities.  However, Washington’s neglect of Islamabad and the NPT regime is 
not without consequences.   
 Beijing’s efforts in making a special set of rules for those outside of the NPT 
regime, of which Islamabad is a member of, is not a coincidence; in fact, the seed was 
perhaps already planted when Washington refused to grant Islamabad its version of the 
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“India deal,” if not earlier.  Chinese consent is required for New Delhi to receive NSG 
approval before the deal moves forward to the Congress.  Based on the current state of 
Sino-Indian relations, it is unlikely that Beijing will object to the U.S.-India nuclear deal.  
Contrary to the American style of “be vocal and hurry things,” the Chinese are known for 
their subtlety and taking their time.  The next chapter, the heart of this thesis, will explore 
Beijing’s perception of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, its reactions, and possible future 
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IV. BEIJING’S PERCEPTIONS OF AND REACTIONS TO THE 
INDIA DEAL 
 The purposes of this chapter are to answer the third question (“How does Beijing 
perceive the U.S.-India nuclear deal?”) and the fourth question (“How will Beijing react 
in the future?”) of this thesis.  In doing so, one must first understand that East Asians 
think differently than Westerners.  This will begin with several critical concepts that are 
“uniquely” Chinese, all of which are vital in understanding how the Chinese perceive, 
and what the Chinese perceive as threats.  From there, questions three and four will be 
answered in the later sections of this chapter. 
 Chapter IV is divided into four sections:  the “uniquely” Chinese concepts, 
Beijing’s perceptions of threats, Beijing’s perceptions of and reactions to the India deal, 
and chapter summary. 
A. THE “UNIQUELY” CHINESE CONCEPTS 
To understand the Chinese way of thinking, one must understand the differences 
between the East Asian way of thinking versus Western thoughts.  According to Dr. 
Richard E. Nisbett, a noted American psychologist, Western thoughts are influenced by 
ancient Greek philosophers and are thus more analytic.  In the Western way of thinking, 
“objects and people are separated from their environment, categorized, and reasoned 
about using logical rules.”  On the other hand, East Asians are influenced by ancient 
Chinese philosophies such as Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism.  The East Asian 
way of thinking is thus holistic, “perceiving and thinking about objects in relation to their 
environments and reasoning dialectically, trying to find the Middle Way between 
opposing propositions.”  Because social practices are different, thoughts are therefore 
different.  .”..the West being individualistic and the East collectivistic.”111  From the 
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above, it can be said that harmony and balance are the dominant factors in 
 the traditional East Asian way of thinking.112   
 Now that it has been established that East Asians think differently than 
Westerners, one must also grasp three “uniquely” Chinese concepts in order to 
understand how the Chinese perceive.  These Chinese concepts are cultural superiority, 
shi, which means soft power, and comprehensive national power.  Since there are ethnic 
Chinese in almost all parts of the world, it must be clarified that the concepts of cultural 
superiority and shi are passed down as part of the traditional Chinese family teachings 
and thus are known to ethnic Chinese worldwide.  However, the concepts of cultural 
superiority and shi are most notable among ethnic Chinese residing in China.  Unlike the 
first two concepts, the concept of comprehensive national power was developed by 
Beijing’s influential elite.   
1. Cultural Superiority   
 If there is one thing that students from Brigadier General Charles W. Hooper’s 
Chinese Foreign Policy class at the Naval Postgraduate School walked away from, it is 
“an inherent belief in the superiority of Chinese culture.”113  The self-perceived “cultural 
superiority” is the result of its 5,000-year-old ancient civilization, the achievements of 
this civilization (i.e., paper, gunpowder, printing, and magnetic compass), its self-
proclaimed “pursuit of peace,” and its defensive approach (as a result of its “Century of 
National Humiliation,” hence the self-proclaimed “victims of foreign aggression” 
mentality), all of which have been consistently demonstrated in Chinese writings and 
rhetoric.   
This “cultural superiority” was evident during PLA Lieutenant General Li Jijun’s 
speech to an audience of American military officers at the U.S. Army War College.  
General Li attributed China’s “uninterrupted civilization” to “the soul of the Chinese 
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nation, which makes unremitting efforts for self-improvement and stresses morality and 
respect for others and national unity.”114  “National unity” is referencing China’s 
“Century of National Humiliation” as a result of the invasion by the West.  To the 
Chinese, despite the fact that America took no part in contributing to its “Century of 
National Humiliation,” the United States is guilty by association for the simple fact that 
America is part of the “West.”   
General Li also told the story of Chinese explorer Zheng He, 87 years before 
Christopher Columbus’ voyage, to emphasize the Chinese goals of “…to convey 
friendship and goodwill and to promote economic and cultural exchanges,” contrary to 
“…Western explorers who conquered the land they discovered….[Zheng He’s] fleet was 
not a voyage to plunder the local populace for treasure nor was it one to 
establish…colonies.”115  An article featured in the opinions section of China Daily on the 
600th anniversary of Zheng He’s first expedition echoed the same sentiment, “…China 
cherishes a similar desire to befriend the world.  But regrettably its goodwill is 
demonized because established powers fear a resurgent China.”116  This article is a rare 
but candid view of Beijing’s belief that countries such as the United States and Japan fear 
its rise.   
Because of its colored-perception of “cultural superiority,” Beijing believes that it 
can transform itself into the global rank of the rich and powerful without resorting to 
violence (as compared to Germany during World War I and Japan during World War II) 
for two reasons.  According to Ye Zicheng, Director for Chinese Strategic Studies at 
Beijing University, “…[Beijing] has no intent[ion] to challenge the existing international 
system through military expansion…”  And because of Beijing’s importance in the global 
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economy, its rise can occur peacefully.117  The implicit message here is, although Beijing 
does not intend to challenge the existing international system militarily, it plans to 
restructure the current international system via economic expansion, as demonstrated in 
its self-proclaimed importance in the global economy.  Should its road to becoming a 
world power be interrupted, Beijing’s self-perceived “righteousness” justifies its decision 
in resorting to military actions.  It is very important to note that, when Beijing’s actions 
are not in line with its rhetoric (i.e., “active defense,” “peaceful development,” “win-
win,” and “mutual security through cooperation”), it still perceives its actions as guided 
by the principles of morality, peace, and defense.118  Regardless of the reasoning behind 
its decisions, Beijing’s self-perceived “righteousness” is the “one size fits all” 
justification to its actions.  
2. Shi (勢 in traditional Chinese or 势 in simplified Chinese)  
 To understand the Chinese mindset, one must also grasp the concept of shi, which 
in general terms means (soft) power, influence, momentum, or tendency.119  In national 
security terms, Chinese linguists define it more specifically as the “strategic configuration 
of power” or “the potential borne of disposition.”  The Chinese believe that shi represents 
the natural power in all things.120  A more mystical Chinese explanation of shi is that the 
ying and the yang (i.e., the sun, the moon, and the stars) have to be “just right” in order 
for one to gain the upper hand to exploit the circumstance to one’s benefit.  The Chinese 
believe that everyone regardless of social status can take advantage of shi by 
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understanding and taking advantage of the situation.  For example, Japan had shi during 
World War II because it was a rising power.  Japan had resources that enabled it to 
achieve its objectives, and it seized the opportunity to exploit the situation to its 
advantage.  However, when Japan was forced to surrender at the end of World War II, 
world politics no longer favored Japan’s rise and therefore Japan had lost shi.  Japan had 
regained shi at the assistance of the United States, which led it to become one of the 
world’s leading economies in the 1980s.  In the case of China, its “Century of National 
Humiliation” was its turn in the bottom of barrel.  Now it is Beijing’s turn to be a rising 
global power, the momentum of becoming a great global power is on its side, and it is 
determined to seize and prolong this “strategic window of opportunity”121 by 
materializing yet another Chinese concept, comprehensive national power.     
3.   Comprehensive National Power (CNP)   
Beijing believes Western powers measure their national strengths in terms of 
military force and international influence (i.e., the size of the U.S. military and how much 
shi Washington has in world affairs, for instance, in convincing the UN to support the 
U.S.-led Iraq war).  Contrary to the West, Beijing’s CNP comprises of a wide range of 
factors and emphasizes survival, development, and international influence.122  According 
to Li Changjiu, “Comprehensive national strength refers to the organic whole of various 
forces possessed by a sovereign state [containing] various elements including resources, 
economy, military, science and technology, education, politics, diplomacy, and national 
willpower and cohesive force.”123  The Chinese developed a mathematical formula to 
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calculate the CNP of ten countries.124  While the mathematical formula seems to be 
objective, the subjectivity is highly questionable because the quantitative values assigned 
are based on the Chinese-perceived international influence of these countries.125   
 Beijing was in the midst of an economic boom when it witnessed the disastrous 
implications of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis in its periphery.  To insulate itself from 
similar incidents, which would disrupt its economic development, Beijing set up a 
research group comprised of more than 100 scholars to calculate, via a mathematical 
formula, the CNP of different countries.  China ranked sixth according to the group’s 
calculus.  A more important conclusion derived from this is that China will continue to 
rise.  According to Li Zhongjie, director of the Central Party School’s Scientific Research 
Department, “China’s political status and influence in the world is constantly on the 
rise.”126  Moreover, despite ranking the United States as number one in CNP, the Chinese 
believe that America’s shi is in decline due to the pursuit of unfavorable unilateral actions 
(i.e., the Iraq war) and thus isolation from the world community, as well as, a developing 
multi-polar world.  The Chinese influential elites believe the United States is well on the 
way to its demise because of the American scholars who write about the decline in 
American soft power.  This Chinese perception has led to yet another formula:   
American actions of alienating the international community 
+ Chinese actions of international cooperation = elevating 
Chinese international stature and influence = strengthened 
Chinese CNP.127   
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Although Beijing’s CNP comprises more than military strength, Chinese military 
strategists use CNP as a framework in guiding their strategic outlook and measuring the 
PLA’s potential combat effectiveness.  According to Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi in 
The Science of Military Strategy, CNP is “the source of combat effectiveness” and “the 
fundamental base for war preparations.”128  In other words, a country’s strong CNP can 
serve as a valuable deterrent against attack, whereas a weak country (defined by a weak 
CNP) is “…often …the first target to be invaded and controlled by hegemonists.”129  In 
short, in Beijing’s eyes, its national strength is multi-faceted, as opposed to the Chinese-
perceived two-prong national strength in the West.   
 Beijing sees the world moving towards multi-polarity, which benefits its rise in 
terms of stature and influence in the world.  Beijing also understands that to sustain a 
strong CNP, it must focus on long term efforts.130  Despite this favorable trend, the “time 
frame” beneficial to Beijing’s growth into a world power “is limited and fraught with 
danger.”  Therefore, Beijing must seize the “window of strategic opportunity” in 
continuing its economic growth and social transformation, while eliminating any external 
threats to maintain peace and stability at the same time.131   
However, despite its multilateralism rhetoric, Beijing does not appear to have 
discarded behaviors associated with its traditional “Middle Kingdom” mentality, as it has 
a very broad definition of what it sees as threats.  For example, Beijing sees anything that 
compromises its sovereignty, territorial integrity, economic growth, social and political 
transformation, “national dignity,” and “status of equality in the international 
community” as threats.  Further, it considers its over-dependence on resources from 
abroad, Washington’s insistence on unilateral actions in world affairs, and its own 
population unable to go beyond the historical memories with Japan (as a result of its own 
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propaganda from some years past) as endangering its national security.132  The next 
section discusses Beijing’s perceptions of threats, as it is also important in answering 
questions three and four in the later part of this chapter.   
B. BEIJING’S PERCEPTIONS OF THREATS 
 To understand Beijing’s perceptions of threats, one must understand that Beijing 
labels threats in two broad categories:  Nontraditional threats and traditional threats.  
Nontraditional threats are issues such as the bird flu, AIDS, terrorism, proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), piracy, drug and human trafficking, economic and 
social disparities, environmental degradation, and energy dependence.  Beijing is 
extremely concerned with these nontraditional threats coming from within because only 
serious internal reforms can fix these issues, and it is unable to carry out these reforms.133 
 While nontraditional threats consist of domestic issues, traditional threats 
originate from abroad.  Traditional threats, according to Beijing’s definition, originate 
from a country’s alleged willingness and capability of jeopardizing China’s national 
security (i.e., sovereignty, economic development, and international stature).  Beijing 
classifies the United States, Japan, and India as traditional threats because of historical 
memories and existing differences, and the abilities these three countries have in 
interrupting China’s rise to becoming a great global power.  Beijing is very concerned 
about the possible containment (i.e., economic, political, and diplomatic) by any or all of 
these countries.  In addition, Beijing is apprehensive towards “the fluctuating, 
unpredictable, and seemingly unstable nature of the democratic process” in the United 
States, Japan, and India.134 
 Since the topic of this thesis deals with two of the three countries that Beijing sees 
as threats, the next section will deal with Beijing’s perception of Washington as a threat, 
followed by its perception of New Delhi as a threat. 
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1. Washington   
 Beijing sees Washington as a threat for two reasons:  Washington’s desires to 
maintain its sole superpower status and the “China threat” theory.  This section will be 
further broken down into two sub-sections to further elaborate why Beijing believes 
Washington is a threat. 
a. Hegemony   
  Beijing’s analysis of Washington as a threat can best be summarized by 
this statement:  “Many hotspot problems are...close to China…complex and fragile 
peripheral security environment…Kashmir and Afghanistan…Korean peninsula…South 
China Sea and Taiwan Strait…‘the American factor’ is behind all these problems…”135  
In reference to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula, one leading Beijing scholar alleges 
Pyongyang’s nuclear test in October 2006 “is brought about by the United States and is 
part of the U.S. strategic plan [in maintaining its hegemony].”  Shen Dingli, Vice 
President of the Institute of International Issues and Director of the U.S. Research Center 
at Fudan University, claims Washington-imposed sanctions on Pyongyang gave 
Pyongyang “an excuse” not to participate in the Six-Party Talks, while at the same time 
insisting Beijing accept responsibilities for Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, 
which was caused by threats from Washington in the first place.  In doing so, Washington 
hopes to “drive a wedge” between Beijing and Pyongyang.  Moreover, Washington is 
“undermining [Beijing’s] influence over [Pyongyang]” by bringing in the “multilateral 
framework of the United Nations.”  Shen further contends that because Washington and 
Seoul have different policies vis-à-vis Pyongyang, Washington intentionally caused 
Pyongyang to conduct nuclear test so to sabotage the Seoul-Pyongyang bilateral relations, 
thereby strengthening the fragile Washington-Seoul relations.136 
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 While Shen’s theory seems far fetched from an American perspective, it is 
representative of Beijing’s obsession with the “American threat.”  Beijing’s leading 
American scholars conclude that Washington’s grand strategy is to maintain hegemony, 
and this perception is apparent in their writings.  For instance, Lie Jianfei, Professor at the 
Central Party School, wrote “The core content of US global strategy…to establish and 
consolidate its world leadership status…and maintain its world hegemony status.”137  
According to Ruan Zongze, Deputy Director and Research Fellow at China Institute of 
International Studies, “…the United States has made the maintenance of its hegemony 
the goal of its global strategy now and for a long time to come.”138  Jin Canrong, Vice 
President and Professor at School of International Relations in Chinese People’s 
University wrote, “…the national strategic goal of the…United States…is, to 
maintain…’world leadership status’ for as long as possible.”139  Wang Jisi, former 
Director of Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
wrote, “The United States is the sole superpower…and will be the only nation…[with 
the] capacity…ambition to exercise global hegemony…”140  
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 These examples reveal Beijing’s infatuation with the concept of 
hegemony, which has a very negative tone in the Mandarin language because Beijing 
faults hegemony as the root cause of its “Century of National Humiliation,” which is still 
deeply ingrained in its people.  Beijing’s obsession with hegemony further reinforces its 
perception of the United States being a hegemonic power.  In fact, the opinion of the 
United States being a hegemonic power dominates all Chinese perceptions about the 
United States today.  Based on this, Beijing concludes that because a rising China 
challenges America’s status as the world’s sole superpower, Washington will thus do 
anything to contain China while it is still capable of doing so.  Beijing further concludes 
that American foreign policy of spreading democracy, unilateralism, and preemption (i.e., 
Taliban in Afghanistan and the Iraq war) is Washington’s way of solidifying and 
prolonging its supremacy.141  This Chinese perception of the American intent on 
prolonging America’s supremacy is very similar to the Chinese way of seizing its so-
called “strategic window of opportunity” via its CNP.   
 Unlike the Chinese, America’s National Security Strategies are published 
on a regular basis as mandated by the U.S. Congress, and when these security doctrines 
are published, they are studied very closely by Beijing’s America-watchers.  
Unsurprisingly, Beijing perceives the 2002 and 2006 United States National Security 
Strategies as threatening because of the emphasis on spreading democracy and “the 
latitude in…acting preemptively.”  From the Chinese perspective, the latter translates to 
interference in others’ domestic affairs, which violates its “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence.”  Wang Pufeng, a senior officer at the Academy of Military Science, is of 
the opinion that the United States National Security Strategy is “threatening because of 
the leeway it provides America in invading China.”142  While Washington has never 
threatened to invade China, Beijing senses otherwise.   
 In essence, Beijing interprets America’s national security strategies as 
evidence in maintaining American hegemony, which is against the Chinese view of the 
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current world trend of multi-polarity.  This is not acceptable to Beijing because it has 
been thriving in a multi-polar world since the late 1980s, and it needs this multi-polarity 
to continue in order to maximize its “strategic window of opportunity” and to achieve its 
modernization goals.  The American cowboys have therefore threatened the Chinese 
security environment, of which Beijing relies on for its prosperity and rise to becoming a 
great global power.143 
  As if the Chinese allegation of American hegemony isn’t enough, 
Beijing’s America-watchers believe Washington’s “China Threat” theory is a strategy in 
limiting China’s rise, which will be discussed next. 
b. The “China Threat” Theory   
  No one can precisely point out the origin of the “China threat” theory, 
although a widely held belief amongst the Chinese scholars is that this theory has been 
around since the Cold War era, and the emphasis of the “China threat” theory is driven by 
the state of U.S.-China bilateral relations.  Regardless of the validity of this theory, “the 
spread of the China threat theory in itself is a threat to China.”144  Beijing does not 
appreciate this anti-China theory for two reasons.  One, this anti-China theory may 
materialize and thus hurt Beijing’s self-proclaimed peace-loving image.  In fact, Beijing 
had begun “to hire international media expertise to polish China’s image” as early as 
1991 to lobby the U.S. Congress for the unconditional renewal of the most-favored-
nation (MFN) trade status, which succeed.  The Chinese also hired an American 
consulting firm to run its public relations campaign in its bid for the 2008 Olympics, 
which also succeed.145  In this case, Beijing is so preoccupied with the “China threat” 
theory that it even published a white paper in 2005 explicitly defending its position while 
implicitly refuting the Chinese-perceived, American-instigated, anti-China theory.  The 
other reason Beijing would like to control this anti-China theory is that it doesn’t want to 
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become Washington’s “strategic rival,” just as Moscow was to Washington during the 
Cold War.  Beijing realizes that if it were Washington’s “strategic rival,” Washington 
would employ whatever means necessary to contain it, which will interrupt its efforts in 
seizing the so-called “strategic window of opportunity.”146 
  Beijing validates its perception of Washington’s anti-China theory through 
American policy statements, American actions, and American academia.  Speeches and 
statements by American law makers are constantly under scrutiny by Chinese scholars.  
As a matter of fact, Beijing interprets these statements as Washington’s acceptance of the 
“China threat” theory.  For instance, Beijing considers former Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld’s June 2005 speech in Singapore “insulting” because Secretary 
Rumsfeld refers to the PLA military build up as “a concern.”  Not only that, it sees the 
congressionally-mandated Pentagon publication, Annual Report to Congress:  The 
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, as proof of Washington’s Cold War 
mentality.  The PLA General Peng Guangqian observed that there have been only two 
occasions where Washington has published on the military power of another country:  
one was on the former Soviet Union, and the other is the current report on China.  
General Peng concludes, “Cooking up this kind of report…reflects typical Cold War 
thinking.”147  The Chinese conclude that the Americans are threatened by them because 
of the congressionally-mandated Pentagon publication.  Based on this, Chinese scholars 
further question how the Americans could feel threatened when its military is far more 
powerful and its budget for military expenditure is significantly higher than that of the 
PLA.148  Of course, the PLA budget is questionable from an American perspective, but 
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the subliminal message here is the typical Chinese-style psychology of pumping one up 
to redirect one’s attention away from the real issue.   
  From Beijing’s perspective, the Pentagon’s report is an indication of 
Washington’s Cold War thinking and suspicion, which is a mentality threatening to the 
PLA’s modernization effort and its quest for international influence.  Not only that, it also 
finds Washington’s actions as proof to the Chinese-perceived, America-instigated, anti-
China theory.  More to the point, Beijing perceives Washington’s actions as efforts to 
contain China’s rise.  For example, it believes that Washington is focused in the Asian 
Pacific region because it is physically surrounded by American forces.  The U.S.-Japan 
security cooperation led Beijing to conclude that it is another of Washington’s strategies 
in limiting China’s rise.  Washington’s strengthened relations with Beijing’s neighbors 
(i.e., Japan, Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, and India) are seen as a part of 
Washington’s ‘grand contain China” plan.  Moreover, because of the extreme emphasis 
the Chinese place on money (they attach monetary values to everything, and they 
determine where a person is in the food chain based on his income), Beijing has 
determined that Washington’s demand to float the RMB is an American strategy in 
further containing China’s rise and therefore is part of America’s “contain China 
policy.”149 
  As if referencing Washington’s policy statements and actions weren’t 
enough, Beijing’s America-watchers also point to American scholars for evidence of the 
“China threat” theory.  Contrary to their American peers, Chinese scholars work for the 
Chinese government and are therefore subordinates of the Chinese Community Party.  
Disregard the different practices in the two countries, Chinese scholars perceive the 
writings of American scholars as indicative of a Washington policy statement.  The 
Chinese influential elite favor John Mearsheimer’s neoconservative theory because it 
“fits” the Chinese explanation of the Chinese-perceived, America-instigated, anti-China 
theory.  Dr. Mearsheimer concludes that Beijing and Washington are “destined to be 
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adversaries” as Beijing will try to take over Asia the way Washington controls the 
Western Hemisphere.150  While Dr. Mearsheimer is an accomplished political scientist at 
the University of Chicago, these Chinese scholars have failed to take into account that Dr. 
Mearsheimer has spent his entire career in academic settings and has not served in any 
official government post.  Nevertheless, Mearsheimer’s conclusion validates Chinese 
perceptions of an American threat; that is, Washington seeks to maintain hegemony and 
therefore seeks to contain China via slowing the dragon’s economic growth.151 
  John Stoessinger’s statement is most appropriate in summarizing Chinese 
perceptions of the American threat, “If a nation perceives another nation to be its enemy, 
and does so hard enough and long enough, it will eventually be right.”152  Now that 
Beijing’s assessment of Washington as a threat has been covered, next section will focus 
on Beijing’s views of New Delhi as a threat, as it is also crucial in answering questions 
three and four that this thesis seeks to answer. 
2. New Delhi   
The best way to predict where New Delhi stands in Beijing’s foreign policy 
priorities is by the number of Indian experts Beijing has.  In fact, it is fair to say that 
Beijing’s India policy is reactionary to Washington’s India policy.  Despite New Delhi’s 
elevated importance in Beijing’s eyes, New Delhi still has far more China experts than 
Beijing has Indian experts.  Nevertheless, Beijing sees New Delhi as a threat for a 
number of reasons.  Besides the enduring Sino-Indian rivalries already covered in 
Chapter one of this thesis, Beijing perceives New Delhi’s competition for resources and 
New Delhi’s military modernization as major sources of threat.  Each of these Chinese-
perceived Indian threats will be elaborated in the subsequent sections.   
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a. Competition   
 For a country that never fails to remind others of its “Century of National 
Humiliation” and the constant implicit display of the “victims of foreign aggression” 
mentality, Beijing appears to have swept its historical differences with New Delhi under 
the rug.  Its rhetoric towards New Delhi now emphasizes cultural similarities, shared 
interests, friendship and cooperation.  Nonetheless, Beijing does not see New Delhi as its 
equal.  In fact, Beijing is superior to New Delhi because, according to Beijing’s own 
mathematical calculation in CNP, Beijing ranked sixth and New Delhi ranked tenth.153  
Zhao Gancheng, Director of South Asia Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International 
Studies, asserts that New Delhi is resentful of Beijing because Beijing developed its 
economy first: “…China started its reforms much earlier…and [China’s achievements] 
seems also more outstanding, and hence a higher position and more important role in the 
world system.”  Not only that, the Chinese economy is far more important than [the] 
Indian economy is in the world.154  Therefore, in comparison, Beijing is superior making 
New Delhi inferior.  And because of this, Beijing is of the opinion that New Delhi views 
Beijing as its competitor.  Beijing faults New Delhi for its erroneous views of Beijing 
both as an aggressor (from the 1962 Sino-Indian War) and a threat (from the 1998 Indian 
nuclear test).  More to the point, Beijing interprets New Delhi’s competition for 
resources, market share, and international influence as confirmation of its perception.  
Unsurprisingly, Beijing blames New Delhi for coercing the Chinese into this same 
competition and justifies its actions as responding to threats from, implicitly, New 
Delhi.155    
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 Sino-Indian competition for resources is not new; rather, it is the intensity 
of their competition that’s making the headlines these days.  When Beijing prevails, New 
Delhi’s “energy diplomacy” has been to “try to neutralize its potential competitors 
(principally China) with cooperation agreements.”156  Realizing competitions lead to 
price increases, which in turn impede Beijing’s attempts in monopolizing world resources 
for as little as possible, Beijing has chosen to diminish this threat via cooperation with 
New Delhi.  Despite the Chinese success in neutralizing the Indian threat in the energy 
arena, competing for international influence is a different story.   Both Beijing and New 
Delhi are vying for shi in the other’s self-perceived sphere of influence while attempting 
to mitigate the growing shi of the other in its own backyard.  New Delhi is irritated by 
Beijing’s abilities in maintaining an upper hand in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and Beijing’s acceptance as an observer by the South Asia Association 
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), of which New Delhi is a sitting member.  On the 
other hand, Beijing is aggravated with New Delhi’s observer status in the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), its quest in gaining a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council, and its pursuit in attaining membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG), all of which Beijing is a sitting member.  Beijing’s activities surrounding New 
Delhi is viewed as a strategy to encircle India, while New Delhi’s cooperation with 
countries that share tumultuous relationships (more explicitly, Washington, Tokyo, and 
Moscow) with Beijing is interpreted as containing China.157  In fact, it was in this context 
that the Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi, warned New Delhi against alignment 
with Washington, “We have nothing against India’s growing ties with the U.S., but Indo-
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U.S. ties should not be directed against a third country (explicitly, China).”158  To sum 
up, Beijing and New Delhi are “not intimate neighbors” and they “lack mutual trust.”159 
b. Military Modernization   
 Besides the Sino-Indian competition for resources and influence, New 
Delhi’s military modernization is viewed as the other major source of Indian threat.  
Beijing has long been both envious and wary of Indian Navy’s power projection in the 
Indian Ocean.  In 1993, the PLA General Zhao Nanqi, Director of the Chinese Academy 
of Military Sciences said, “We are not prepared to let the Indian Ocean become India’s 
Ocean…”160  It perceives a stronger Indian navy, New Delhi’s acquisitions of advanced 
weapons, and its growing nuclear arsenal as evidence of New Delhi’s response to the 
anti-China theory.  One Chinese scholar concluded in 2001 that New Delhi’s 
“momentum of arms procurement is violent,” and the most worrisome point is the 
“agreements with [Moscow] to purchase aircraft carriers, tanks, and fighters.”161  The 
Sino-Soviet split and Moscow’s support of New Delhi in the Sino-Indian War have led to 
Chinese India scholar Hu Shisheng’s observation:  “…Russia and India…signing more 
than 350 defense cooperation agreements…Russia’s ‘show of favoritism toward India at 
the expense of China’ has [resulted in the sale of] three major weapons systems.”162   
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 So, of all sources of Indian threat, ranging from New Delhi’s potential as a 
destabilizing force in Tibet, New Delhi’s political and social instabilities, to New Delhi’s 
competition for resources and influence, Beijing perceives New Delhi’s military 
modernization as the most threatening.  Based on this, it is logical to say that Beijing 
feels threatened by the U.S.-India strategic cooperation because it is all about Washington 
helping New Delhi in military modernization, which includes expanding New Delhi’s 
nuclear arsenal.  Since the Chinese perceive Washington and New Delhi as threats, what 
are Beijing’s perceptions of the U.S.-India nuclear deal?  What are Beijing’s reactions to 
the U.S.-India nuclear deal?  Both of these questions will be answered in the following 
sections. 
C. BEIJING’S PERCEPTIONS OF AND REACTIONS TO THE INDIA DEAL 
 The basis of how the Chinese perceive and what the Chinese perceive as threats 
have been established.  We now have the tools to answer questions three (“How does 
Beijing perceive the U.S.-India nuclear deal?”) and four (“How will Beijing react in the 
future?”) of this thesis.  In doing so, this section is further divided into the subsequent 
subsections:  Beijing’s white paper on arms control, and Beijing’s perceptions of and 
reactions to the India deal. 
1. Beijing’s White Paper on Arms Control   
 In examining the Chinese position on arms control, this section will begin with a 
brief history of Beijing’s journey to becoming a nuclear power and what it had to do to 
get the U.S.-China civil nuclear agreement during the Reagan administration, followed by 
a brief analysis of Beijing’s position on arms control. 
 Beijing’s journey to becoming a nuclear power started in the 1950s.  As a reward 
for siding with Moscow during the initial phase of the Cold War, Beijing began its 
nuclear weapons program with Moscow’s assistance in 1955.  After the Sino-Soviet split, 
Beijing pursued an independent nuclear program and conducted its first nuclear test in 
1965.  Mao Zedong viewed the success of his nuclear program as “…a symbol of China’s 
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final drive to total independence” and “as an important source” of his power.163  The 
Chinese official statement following its first nuclear test in Lop Nur reaffirmed Mao 
Zedong’s paper tiger thesis and emphasized that “…The truth is exactly to the contrary.  
In developing nuclear weapons, China’s aim is to break the monopoly of the nuclear 
powers and to eliminate nuclear weapons…On the question of nuclear weapons, China 
will neither commit the error of adventurism nor the error of capitulationism.  The 
Chinese people can be trusted.”164   
Beijing upheld its firm stance on nuclear proliferation until the early 1980s, when 
it shifted focus to nuclear energy as a way to address the severe power shortages from its 
reliance on coal and hydroelectric power.  The potential of the Chinese nuclear market 
and the Chinese preference of American companies due to technological superiorities 
coincided with Washington’s goal of bringing Beijing into the international 
nonproliferation mainstream.  From the initial talks in September 1981 to Congressional 
approval in July 1985, the U.S.-China civil nuclear energy cooperation took four years to 
complete, twice as long in comparison to the U.S.-India nuclear deal.  Beijing’s 
unwillingness to commit to the NPT due to historical memories and allegations of its 
assistance to Islamabad’s nuclear program delayed the negotiation process.  Nevertheless, 
Beijing’s desperate need for foreign assistance in developing its nuclear energy program 
forced it to accede to the IAEA in 1984.  Beijing dropped its proliferation rhetoric in May 
1984 when Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang publicly stated that China does not “engage in 
nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries to develop nuclear 
weapons.”  Beijing’s position in nonproliferation became more explicit in January 1985 
when Vice Premier Li Peng said, “China has no intention, either at the present or in the 
future, to help non-nuclear countries to develop nuclear weapons.”  The attainment of the 
U.S.-China nuclear cooperation was closely linked to Beijing’s actions in accepting the 
 
 
                                                 
163 Michael Yahuda, China’s Role in World Affairs (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1978), 109-113. 
164 Ibid., 139. 
61 
IAEA safeguard and clarification of its nonproliferation policy.165  Beijing became a 
signatory to the NPT in 1992, and a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 
2004.   
In the U.S.-China nuclear deal, it appears that Beijing had to comply with nearly 
all of Washington’s demands; whereas in the U.S.-India nuclear deal, Washington seems 
to be appeasing New Delhi by giving in to almost everything New Delhi asked for.  More 
to the point, Beijing perceives Washington’s willingness to team up with an “inferior” 
New Delhi as evidence of a China containment intent.  As an implicit denouncement of 
the U.S.-India nuclear deal, Beijing published a white paper on arms control in August 
2005, weeks after the announcement of the U.S.-India civil nuclear energy agreement 
was made in July 2005.  This strategy bears a strong resemblance to Beijing’s publication 
of a white paper on its nonproliferation policy in December 2003.  That white paper was 
aimed at controlling rumors of Beijing’s alleged violation of nonproliferation protocols 
prior to becoming a member of the NSG in 2004.  In analyzing Beijing’s perceptions of 
and reactions to the India deal, it is imperative to examine Beijing’s official position on 
weapons proliferation.   
According to Beijing’s white paper on arms control, China’s Endeavors for Arms 
Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, because of its experience during the 
“Century of National Humiliation,” Beijing understands and therefore fully supports 
world peace, referencing its “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.”  The purpose of 
publishing this white paper was to “fully elaborate [Beijing’s policies and 
positions]…and to give a systematic account of China’s involvement in the international 
[community].”  Several points in this white paper are worth dissecting.  First, in terms of 
handling arms control issues, Beijing “always bases its policy-making on the judgment 
whether it serves to safeguard national sovereignty and security, whether it serves to 
maintain global strategic stability and whether it serves to promote security for all and 
mutual trust among countries.”  The key word here is “judgment,” which implies that 
Beijing will do what it perceives as the right thing to do to benefit from whatever the 
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circumstance may be.  Second, besides the implicit attack on Washington (i.e., Beijing 
“will never seek hegemony and…[support] safeguarding world peace…”), Beijing holds 
“the two countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals [responsible] for nuclear 
disarmament.”   The embedded message here is this:  Beijing will not be the first to 
reduce its nuclear arsenals; in fact, the “victims of foreign aggression” mind-set justifies 
Beijing’s possession of nuclear arsenals, which is forced on it by Washington and 
Moscow in the first place.  Third and the most obvious reference to the U.S.-India nuclear 
deal is Beijing’s assertion of having “…persistently exercised the utmost restraint on the 
scale and development of…nuclear weapons.”166  Beijing is undoubtedly accusing 
Washington of aiding the growth of New Delhi’s nuclear arsenal.  In fact, the U.S.-India 
nuclear deal is Washington’s indirect endorsement of New Delhi’s military nuclear 
program.   
Now we know Beijing’s official position on arms control, that it will do what it 
perceives as the right thing to do to exploit the circumstances, that it will not reduce its 
nuclear arsenals until Washington and Moscow do so, and that it holds Washington 
responsible for the increase in New Delhi’s nuclear arsenal.  The next section will cover 
Beijing’s perception of and reactions to the India deal.   
2. Beijing’s Perceptions of and Reactions to the India deal   
 As an opening to its defensive strategy, the PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu 
Jianchao says China “hopes the U.S.-India nuclear deal …  [would] abide the non-
proliferation rules.”167  While Beijing officially kept silent of its opposition, the 
government-controlled media outlets blasted the U.S.-India nuclear deal.  China Daily 
reported this news infused with the typical communist propaganda.  It interprets the U.S.-
India nuclear deal as how far Washington is willing to go in “maintaining regional 
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strategic balance,”168 which means strengthening an inferior country’s (New Delhi) 
international stature in order to contain a superior one (Beijing).  The China News Agency 
described this deal as Washington’s “….best bargaining chip and a counterweight to 
China” because New Delhi is a democracy and Washington’s model of economic 
development.169  People’s Daily accused Washington of applying “double standards” on 
nuclear proliferation, and that others would follow the precedence made in the U.S.-India 
nuclear deal and weaken the NPT regime.170  China Daily said the U.S.-India nuclear 
deal will “trigger a chain reaction of nuclear technology proliferation” and further 
“complicate the nuclear issues of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea all 
the more.”171   
 Shen Dingli, a nuclear security expert and Vice President of Institute of 
International Studies at Fudan University asserts that the U.S.-India nuclear deal is about 
helping New Delhi developing nuclear weapons aimed at Islamabad while “containing 
another country.”  Shen further claims that Washington’s assistance in New Delhi’s 
nuclear weapons program “is intended to suppress the rise of what in the eyes of 
[Washington] is an ‘authoritarian’ power.”172  Moreover, Shen accused Washington of 
“contributing to nuclear proliferation” as “[New Delhi] can now devote its resources and 
energy to the research and development of nuclear weapons…Wouldn’t it be possible for 
other nuclear states to cooperate with Pakistan in the development of nuclear energy?  
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Pakistan…has a need to develop civil nuclear energy and the right to do so…”173  Beijing 
has signaled that it could do the same with Islamabad.   
 Despite the biased reporting by the Chinese media, it praised New Delhi for being 
a leader of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) countries with its own strategic interest in 
mind:  “India will still maintain an independent and all-round diplomatic posture to gain 
its own maximum state interest…[and] will not easily board any ship because India itself 
is a large ship.”174  Compared to the 1998 nuclear test, Beijing’s reactions are rather 
restrained this time around.  In fact, this is indicative of Beijing’s stepped-up effort in 
courting New Delhi, which is representative of its strategy to neutralize threat with 
cooperation. 
 According to Dr. Jing-Dong Yuan, an expert on Asia-Pacific security, arms 
control and nonproliferation, America’s Asia policy, and China’s defense and foreign 
policy at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, as a general rule of thumb, 
Beijing’s official position is always indirect and subtle, which explains its initial 
response.  Despite the official silence from Beijing, the fact that a series of articles 
criticizing the U.S.-India nuclear deal was published in the tightly-controlled Chinese 
media outlets reflects Beijing’s silent approval of these articles.175  In other words, 
Beijing implicitly disapproves of the India nuclear deal.  As a matter of fact, Beijing 
blames Washington for the India deal because this deal violates the NPT, says Dr. Phillip 
C. Saunders, a China watcher at the National Defense University’s Institute for National 
Strategic Studies.  Nevertheless, since Beijing also provided assistance to Islamabad’s 
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nuclear weapons and missile programs, neither can point fingers at one another because 
both Washington and Beijing are violating NPT together.176   
 Beijing is aware that it is in a complicated situation and thus must handle its 
objection to this nuclear deal delicately.  First, it is keenly aware that it cannot stop the 
U.S.-India nuclear deal, as Beijing’s objections to the deal at the NSG will upset New 
Delhi hence jeopardizing the improved Sino-Indian diplomatic ties that it has worked 
hard to rebuild since the 1998 Indian nuclear test.  Second, from a big picture stand point, 
Beijing cares more about the hidden agenda behind the India nuclear deal than the deal 
itself, says Dr. Yuan.  Based on the history of U.S.-Indian relations, Beijing is more 
apprehensive about the anti-China agenda behind the “estranged democracies” becoming 
“strategic partners.”  In fact, Beijing has noted Washington’s pattern of cozying up to 
New Delhi as early as President George W. Bush took office.  Details such as 
Washington honoring former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee with a formal state dinner 
versus treating the current Chinese President Hu Jintao with a “working dinner,” as well 
as, reports of President Bush intentionally surprised the Indian delegates by dropping in 
to their meeting with Secretary of State Dr. Rice, which led to a 40-minute unscheduled 
meeting in the Oval Office, have all been analyzed by Beijing as a part of Washington’s 
efforts in containing a rising China.  Beijing was initially more concerned with the 
defense cooperation dimension of the U.S.-India strategic cooperation, but Beijing’s 
success in its January 2007 ASAT test has since bolstered the Chinese confidence.177 
  As if signaling that Beijing is prepared to counter Washington’s growing clout in 
its self-perceived sphere of influence, Chinese President Hu Jintao’s South Asian trip in 
November 2006 included India and Pakistan, where multitudes of Sino-India and Sino-
Pak agreements, to include Sino-Indian civil nuclear cooperation, were signed.  The U.S.-
India nuclear deal has resulted in Beijing stepping up its courtship with its neighbors 
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south of its border.  Despite the U.S.-India “love fest,”178 Beijing perceives this “love 
fest” as one-sided due to Washington’s strategic concerns in Asia, says Dr. Yuan.179  
People’s Daily reported that New Delhi is merely seizing the opportunity to rise as a 
global power out of “practical political considerations,” and further pointed out that 
“India’s DNA doesn’t allow itself to become an ally subordinate to the U.S., just like 
Japan or Britain.”180 
 Now that we know Beijing’s perceptions of the India deal, what are its reactions 
and possible future actions?  First and foremost, Beijing is not prepared to push New 
Delhi towards Washington by objecting to the India deal at the NSG.  Shen Dengli, a 
Chinese nuclear security expert at Fudan University, says Beijing will not “stand out to 
oppose the agreement; it doesn’t want to offend” Washington or New Delhi.  If Beijing 
were to object, “…the political costs of opposing it would be too high.  It would drive a 
wedge between China and India…but China may demand adjustments, even just to make 
a point about its concerns,” says Zhang Li, a Chinese expert on South Asia at Sichuan 
University.  Beijing’s own analysis of the India deal suggests that the deal is a part of 
Washington’s “contain China” strategy, but New Delhi is unlikely to form an alliance 
with Washington due to its own strategic interests and pledge to Non-Aligned Movement 
from some years past.181   
 While it appears that Beijing may be unwillingly stuck with the short end of the 
stick this time for the sake of “saving face,” it is prepared to exploit the situation as subtly 
stated in its white paper on arms control.  The PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesperson said 
Beijing “believes…countries may cooperate in the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy…observing…international obligations…safeguard and strengthen the principles 
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and effectiveness of the international nonproliferation mechanism.”182  Beijing is 
signaling that it is ready to exploit the circumstance by venturing into the $100 billion 
dollar Indian nuclear market, which in turn, fuels the Chinese economy.  The PRC 
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu said, “Based on the principles, we are ready to 
have discussions [relaxation of nuclear exports to New Delhi.”183  Another way the 
Chinese will surely make use of the situation is their “let’s wait for the final framework to 
be presented at the NSG” approach, says Dr. Yuan.  Beijing does not see a need to “block 
the road” currently being paved by Washington.  If the India deal gets its blessings from 
the NSG, then Beijing can pursue the same with Islamabad, as the exception will have 
been made for Washington and New Delhi.  How Beijing reacts in the future depends on 
the final framework as approved by the NSG, comments Dr. Yuan.184   
As of the writing of this thesis, the U.S.-India nuclear deal has not been forwarded 
to NSG for approval.  However, assuming the Singh government survives this nuclear 
deal and the deal is approved by the NSG and the U.S. Congress in a timely manner 
before it is dead in the water, what are the implications for Washington as a result of 
Beijing’s reactions to the India nuclear deal?  This question will be answered in the next 
chapter.   
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
While ascending to become a global power, Beijing has never failed to remind the 
world of how far it has come since its “Century of National Humiliation.”  Desperate for 
resources to fuel its economy, Beijing is pursuing a grand strategy based on its “Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” in the hopes that international stability will buy the 
time it needs for transformation into the elite rank of the global rich and powerful.  
President George W. Bush’s public acknowledgement of New Delhi as “a legitimate 
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nuclear power” ended its 30-year quest for such recognition.185  His statement also forced 
Beijing to face the reality that New Delhi is the other rising global power in Asia.   
We have covered a lot in this chapter.  In particular, the “uniquely” Chinese 
concepts had to be clarified in order to explain how the Chinese perceive, and Beijing’s 
perceptions of threats had to be covered to understand what the Chinese perceive as 
threats.  In answering Beijing’s perceptions and reactions to the India deal, Beijing’s 
official position on arms control also had to be explored.  We now know that Beijing sees 
the India deal is part of Washington’s “contain China” strategy and that it believes New 
Delhi will not tilt to Washington due to its own strategic interests.  Nevertheless, Beijing 
has stepped up courting New Delhi as an attempt to counter Washington’s growing 
influence in South Asia.  Beijing is also ready to take advantage of the “Indian exception” 
by benefiting from the Indian nuclear market and backing Islamabad in seeking its own 
version of the similar exception from the NSG.  The next chapter will answer the major 
question this thesis seeks to answer and provide policy recommendations relating to U.S. 
foreign policies in Asia. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S REACTIONS FOR THE 
UNITED STATES 
 The purpose of this concluding chapter is to answer question five of this thesis:  
What are the implications of Chinese reactions for the United States?  In doing so, this 
chapter is divided into three sections:  a summary of the analysis presented thus far, an 
answer to question five of this thesis, and recommendations relating to U.S. foreign 
policy in Asia. 
A. RECAP 
The U.S.-India nuclear deal, in essence, was not well-thought through because of 
the enormous number of concessions Washington is giving to New Delhi in what appears 
to be an effort to contain China.  In the process of doing so, Washington has damaged the 
nonproliferation regime.  Moreover, the India deal will lead to an increase in India’s 
nuclear arsenal and thus tilt the balance of power in Asia.  Instead of having a rising 
China to deal with, now Washington has to find a balance between China and India, as 
New Delhi appears to be standing firm in guarding its own strategic interests. 
Chapter II described the enduring Sino-Indian rivalries and answered the first two 
questions posed by this thesis.  In responding to the first question (what was the 
relationship between Beijing and New Delhi before 9/11?), Sino-Indian relations prior to 
9/11 can be characterized as tumultuous, distrustful, and full of diplomatic pretense.  The 
Cold War played an important role in the state of Sino-Indian relations in the aftermath of 
the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict.  Sino-Indian normalization coincided with the 
ending of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union.  India’s 1998 nuclear test 
brought unusually strong reaction from Beijing, but it did not stop the two from resuming 
their diplomatic relations after the 1998 South Asian Crisis.  In answering the second 
question (what is Washington’s view vis-à-vis Sino-Indian relation before 9/11?), Beijing 
was more important than New Delhi, as reflected in the U.S. foreign policy during the 
Cold War era.  However, the shift in post-Cold War geopolitics has elevated New Delhi’s 
importance, as demonstrated in Washington’s current foreign policy priorities.    
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Chapter III described the emerging U.S.-India strategic partnership with emphasis 
on the U.S.-India nuclear deal.  This chapter highlighted Washington’s “appeasement”186 
of New Delhi and compared it to New Delhi’s “appeasement” of Beijing half a century 
ago.  The appearance of caving in to most of New Delhi’s demands highlights 
Washington’s eagerness to influence the geopolitical balance in Asia and the importance 
of both New Delhi and Beijing in the U.S. foreign policy priorities.  Washington’s 
violation of the nonproliferation regime and its neglect of Islamabad have led to Beijing’s 
efforts in exploiting cracks in the U.S. foreign policies.   
Chapter IV covered several Chinese concepts, which are essential in 
understanding how and what the Chinese perceive as threats.  Beijing’s official position 
on arms control was also examined before the third and the fourth questions were 
answered.  In response to the third question (how does Beijing perceive the U.S.-India 
nuclear deal?), Beijing sees the India deal as Washington’s strategy in limiting China’s 
rise, and it concludes that New Delhi will not lean towards Washington as a result of the 
U.S.-India nuclear deal.  In answering the fourth question (how will Beijing react in the 
future?), Beijing has stepped up its courtship of New Delhi in an attempt to counter 
Washington’s growing influence in South Asia.  Additionally, Beijing is ready to benefit 
from the Indian nuclear energy market and backing Islamabad’s efforts to obtain its own 
exception from the NSG.   
So far, the first four questions have been answered.  The next section will answer 
the fifth question (what are the implications of China’s reactions for the United States?).  
B. IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S REACTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
 If there is one word most commonly used to describe the typical Chinese way of 
doing things, it would be subtleness, which is very different than the western-style of 
conducting business and therefore not easy for the West to comprehend.  In the case of 
the U.S.-India nuclear deal, strategic implications of China’s reactions for the United 
States can be broken down to short-term and long-term categories. 
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 In the short-term, Beijing is unlikely to take radical actions against Washington or 
New Delhi because of its interdependence in the global economy, more specifically, the 
global energy market.   Therefore, Beijing has chosen to silently denounce this deal 
because it doesn’t want to offend Washington and New Delhi, as it still needs 
Washington and New Delhi’s cooperation in other international forums to facilitate its 
own economic growth.  However, despite of this, Beijing may choose to demonstrate its 
implicit disapproval further by abstaining from the vote or be notably absent from the 
NSG if and when the deal comes up for vote.   
 Nonetheless, to the Chinese, settling of scores doesn’t have to be immediate and it 
can take different forms.  They will wait for the perfect opportunity regardless of 
however long it may take.  Cases in point are Beijing’s claim of Arunachal Pradesh and 
the Chinese ASAT test.  Arunachal Pradesh is one of the disputed territories that caused 
the 1962 Sino-Indian War.  It has been nearly half-a-century since the 1962 war, and 
Beijing has not relinquished its claim over Arunachal Pradesh, which was granted Indian 
statehood by Rajiv Gandhi in 1987.  On the eve of Chinese President Hu Jintao’s 
historical visit to India in November 2006, the Chinese Ambassador to India told the 
Indian press that “the whole of what you call the [Indian] state of Arunachal Pradesh is 
Chinese territory…we are claiming all of that—that’s our position.”187  This remark not 
only shows Beijing’s determination to maintain sovereignty in disputed territory but also 
illustrates the resolve Beijing has in achieving its objectives.  Another concrete example 
is Beijing’s success in its January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test, where it destroyed one 
of its own orbiting weather satellites.  The Chinese have devoted decades of efforts and 
resources in making its ASAT success a reality.  In fact, Jane’s Intelligence Review 
reported that Beijing had three unsuccessful attempts in July 2005 and February 2006.188    
These concrete examples suggest that long-term strategic implications of China’s 
reactions for the United States cannot be overlooked.  The analysis presented in this 
thesis has identified two effects of the U.S.-India nuclear deal that have major long-term 
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implications.  These are an increase in India’s CNP, and the violation of the NPT.  Each 
of these implications is discussed as follows. 
1. Increase in India’s Comprehensive National Power (CNP)   
 The first long-term strategic implication of Beijing’s reactions is that the U.S.-
India nuclear deal increases India’s CNP, which indirectly weakens the Chinese CNP and 
that of Pakistan, India’s archrival.  To counter India’s strengthened CNP and to 
strengthen its own CNP, Beijing is likely to either accelerate its growth or extend its 
current plan beyond “the initial decades of the 21st Century,”189 and continue to 
strategically encircle India. 
 Sun Tzu says to hold your friends close and your enemies closer.  The U.S.-India 
nuclear deal forced Beijing to face the reality that New Delhi is the other rising global 
power in Asia.  In fact, the India deal has already resulted in Beijing’s stepped-up 
courtship of New Delhi and its strategy of encircling India.  For example, the long-
standing Sino-Pakistani partnership is likely to intensify.  Beijing will ensure that 
Islamabad stays competitive with New Delhi.  One should not be surprised if Beijing 
supports Islamabad in seeking a similar exception at the NSG.  In addition, Beijing will 
reinforce its ties with Yangon to ensure that the Chinese investments in Myanmar’s 
maritime developments are not fruitless, which in turn would ensure the PLA Navy’s 
uninterrupted access to the Indian Ocean.  As the PLA General Zhao Nanqi said, “We are 
not prepared to let the Indian Ocean become India’s Ocean…”190  With the recent 
democratic uprising in Myanmar, both Beijing and New Delhi have chosen not to 
interfere with Yangon’s domestic affairs, as non-interference is one of the Five Principles 
of Peaceful Coexistence preached often by the Chinese.  Nevertheless, the hidden agenda 
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shared by Beijing and New Delhi is their shared interest in tapping Yangon’s 
undeveloped resources (i.e., timber and natural gas).  Additionally, as part of the strategy 
to encircle New Delhi, Beijing will continue to expand cooperation with Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka, Iran, and others in South and Southeast Asia.    
 Besides strategically encircling India, Beijing will intensify its military 
modernization effort to stay competitive with that of New Delhi, currently aided by 
Washington.  While the PLA’s power projection is currently confined to China’s 
immediate periphery, analysts in the West generally agree that the aim of the PLA’s 
power projection is the United States.  Aside from military competition, Beijing will act 
to limit New Delhi’s quest for expanded international influence, just as it has been 
successful in preventing Japan from becoming a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council.  President George W. Bush said in September 2007 that he is ready to discuss 
adding more members to the UN Security Council without elaborating further.  An 
educated guess would be India, as this would be the next step in New Delhi’s quest to 
become a global power.  Nonetheless, Beijing will see to it that this doesn’t become a 
reality.  
2. Violation of the NPT Regime   
The second long-term strategic implication of Beijing’s reactions is that the U.S.-
India nuclear deal damages the NPT regime.  As Henry Sokolski pointed out during his 
Congressional testimony, this deal violates Article I of the NPT, which prohibits states 
(i.e., the United States) from helping nuclear weapons efforts of those (i.e., India) that did 
not have nuclear weapons prior to the treaty’s completion.  Regardless of Washington’s 
rhetoric of bringing New Delhi “into the nonproliferation mainstream” via this nuclear 
deal, the fact that New Delhi is still not a signatory to the NPT cannot be disputed.  
Moreover, this deal “trades away our credibility on North Korea and Iran…the United 
States will be joining the ranks of North Korea and Iran as NPT violators.”191  Because of 
Washington’s strategy in balancing geopolitics in Asia and therefore the unintentional 
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infringement of the NPT, Beijing sees it as an indication that it is acceptable to violate the 
NPT because Washington, the world’s superpower, does it.   
Therefore, Beijing is likely do the same with Islamabad, a non-NPT state, thus 
further damage the nonproliferation regime.  The serious consequence of this implication 
cannot be overstated as it jeopardizes the legitimacy of the NPT regime.  Furthermore, 
this nuclear deal allows New Delhi to expand its civilian nuclear power program and free 
up its uranium to build more nuclear weapons, which tilts the balance of power in Asia.  
As former Secretary of State Colin Powell said during an interview in regards to this 
nuclear deal, it is difficult to separate nuclear programs that are for weapons from those 
that are for peaceful purposes.192  If New Delhi decides to build more nuclear weapons, it 
would not be violating the NPT because it is not a signatory to the NPT.  Nevertheless, 
the nuclear deal itself has already strengthened New Delhi’s comprehensive national 
power from Beijing’s perspective. 
 In answering the fifth and the major question of this thesis, an increase in India’s 
CNP and damage to the nonproliferation regime are the two major implications of 
China’s reactions to the India nuclear deal for the United States.  If strengthening India’s 
CNP is the implicit goal of the George W. Bush administration, then it certainly has 
achieved this goal.  However, if President Bush’s goal were to influence India’s foreign 
policy to lean towards the United States, then efforts and resources devoted to make this 
nuclear deal happen may be wasted, because as of the writing of this thesis, India’s 
domestic political climate doesn’t appear to allow it.  Based on implications of China’s 
reactions, the next section provides recommendations relating to U.S. foreign policy 
toward Asia.  
                                                 
192 Richard Speier, “U.S. Satellite Space Lunch Cooperation and India’s Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missile Program,” in Gauging U.S.-India Strategic Cooperation, ed. Henry Sokolski (Carlisle:  Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2007), 186-187.  http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.  Date accessed:  July 21, 
2007.  General Powell’s interview with the Washington Post on the development of diplomatic relations 
with India took place on October 3, 2003:  Glenn Kessler and Peter Slevin, “Washington Post Reporters 
Interview Powell,” Washington Post, October 3, 2003, available at 
www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A41977-2003Oct3.html.   
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C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ASIA 
 Considering the current political and media forces on the war in Iraq and the 
overall War on Terror, it is a diversion to consider foreign policy interactions in Asia.  
Based on the major implications of China’s reactions, two specific policy 
recommendations for Asia are presented. 
 The first recommendation is focused on China.  Beijing’s unprecedented military 
modernization is already tilting the regional balance of power.  Washington needs to act 
to keep that balance stable.  A two-prong strategy, military and economic, is needed to 
maintain this balance.   
 Militarily, Washington should aggressively pursue increasing the military 
capabilities of Beijing’s regional competitors.  Beijing views Washington’s joint military 
exercises with its democratic neighbors in Asia such as Japan, Australia, Thailand, and 
India, as threats.193  The PLA General Peng Guanqian stated that a country’s military 
combat effectiveness has become increasingly more important in a country’s overall 
CNP; hence, military competition is “key to the strategic thoughts of all countries.”194  
Beijing’s focus on CNP should be used to illustrate the regional shift in the balance of 
power to our allies and Beijing’s regional competitors.  By working to increase the 
military component of these countries’ CNP, Washington would be re-stabilizing the 
balance and also indirectly forcing the PLA to continue on its costly expansion programs.  
It should be made clear to all that these actions are in response to the PLA’s 
modernization efforts and not a new anti-China initiative.   
 Economically, in a complimentary effort to slow Beijing’s CNP growth, 
Washington should hold Beijing accountable for non-compliance to its WTO obligations 
and pull its permanent Most Favorable Nation (MFN) trade status if necessary.  This 
would work to reduce the explosive growth of the Chinese economy, which would reduce 
the availability of funds for the continued PLA modernization.  President Reagan pushed 
for Star Wars ahead of its time, which resulted in the collapse of the former Soviet Union 
                                                 
193 Jing-Dong Yuan, interview by author, Monterey, California, September 17, 2007. 
194 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing:  Military Science 
Publishing House, 2005), 127. 
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and ended the Cold War.  The collapse occurred because Moscow could not keep up with 
Washington’s military evolution, and Beijing is aware of this.  Actions by Beijing’s self-
perceived competitors to increase their own CNP and military readiness in response to 
the PLA’s modernizations should cause the CCP to re-evaluate its priorities.   
 The second policy recommendation is to keep on the table Washington’s offer to 
assist Islamabad in meeting its growing energy needs.  In March 2006, Energy Secretary 
Samuel Bodman and his team of seven went to Islamabad for discussions on how 
Washington can provide such assistance.  Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri 
and his team of twelve reportedly provided the U.S. camp different proposals that 
Islamabad deemed as “do-able” by Washington.  One of these proposals included civil 
nuclear energy, but Secretary Bodman said “…no such assistance was being extended to 
Pakistan.”  However, as an alternative, Washington offered to help Islamabad in 
developing potential energy sources such as coal, gas pipelines (barring the Iran-
Pakistan-India gas pipeline), and renewable energy such as cellulose-based ethanol and 
wind or solar energy, which were rejected by Islamabad.195  Washington should revive 
this offer to Islamabad and maintain positive bilateral relations with the Pakistani 
government, particularly the Pakistani military.  Additionally, Washington should not 
object to assistance from any country, specifically China and France, for Pakistan’s 
civilian energy projects.  Most importantly, different government agencies in Washington 
should act in unison when making public statements about Pakistan.  For instance, James 
Clad, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia, said 
“India simply…matters more for us than Pakistan.”196  Despite immediate clarifications 
by the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad stating Washington’s position of not ranking countries 
in any framework of strategic interests,197 damage has already been done and is 
irreversible.   
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 Aside from these specific policy recommendations, Washington should also 
ensure senior representative attendance in all major multi-lateral association activities and 
reflect Sun Tzu’s philosophy of keeping friends close and enemies closer.  In closing, 
Washington’s intimate involvement in Asia’s geopolitics is key to prolong America’s soft 
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